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Conscientious Objection to Creating Same-Sex 
Unions: An International Analysis 
	 Bruce	MacDougall,1	Elsje	Bonthuys,2																															
Kenneth	McK.	Norrie3	&	Marjolein	van	den	Brink4
In	jurisdictions	that	recognize	same-sex	marriages	and	unions,	the	question	arises	
as	to	the	extent	to	which	civic	officials	who	normally	preside	at	such	unions	can	
refuse	such	participation	for	religious	reasons.	This	paper	examines	this	 issue	in	
the	 context	 of	 four	 jurisdictions:	 Scotland,	 Canada,	 the	Netherlands	 and	 South	
Africa.	What	 is	 striking	 is	 how	 different	 is	 the	 process	 of	 reaching	 a	 resolution	
in	 each	 jurisdiction,	 though	 the	actual	 result	might	be	 the	 same.	This	difference	
arises	 because	 of	 the	 jurisdiction-specific	 reasons	 why	 same-sex	 marriages	 and	
unions	 are	 recognized,	 how	 they	 are	 recognized,	 the	 status	 of	 the	 officers	 who	
preside	over	the	relevant	services,	and	the	historical-legal	place	of	religion	in	each	
jurisdiction.	 Against	 these	 backgrounds,	 reasonably	 similar	 arguments	 relating	
to	 discrimination	 and	 accommodation	 are	 raised,	 but	 play	 out	 differently	 given	
the	varying	 contexts.	There	 results	 from	 this	 comparative	 analysis	 some	 lessons	
that	can	be	transported	across	jurisdictions	but	also	considerable	caution	as	to	the	
generic	quality	of	such	lessons.
Dans	les	juridictions	qui	reconnaissent	les	mariages	et	les	unions	entre	personnes	
du	 même	 sexe,	 une	 question	 survient	 quant	 au	 sujet	 du	 droit	 des	 officiants	
présidant	à	ces	unions	de	refuser	d’y	participer	pour	des	raisons	religieuses.	Cet	
article	 examine	 la	 question	 dans	 quatre	 pays:	 l’Écosse,	 le	 Canada,	 les	 Pays-Bas	
et	 l’Afrique	 du	 Sud.	 Bien	 que	 chaque	 juridiction	 résout	 cette	 question	 par	 un	
processus	différent,	la	solution	retenue	est	semblable.	Ces	approches	différentes	sont	
dues	aux	circonstances	nationales	particulières	quant	aux	raisons	pour	lesquelles	
les	mariages	 et	 unions	 entre	 personnes	 du	même	 sexe	 sont	 reconnus,	 comment	
ils	sont	reconnus,	le	statut	des	officiants	qui	y	président	ainsi	que	le	rôle	légal	et	
historique	 de	 la	 religion.	Dans	 ces	 contextes,	 des	 arguments	 semblables	 reliés	 à	
la	discrimination	et	 l’accommodation	sont	soulevés	mais	se	 répercutent	de	 façon	
différente	dépendant	du	contexte	national.	De	cette	analyse	comparative	ressortent	
des	conclusions	qu’il	est	possible	d’appliquer	aux	autres	juridictions,	sans	toutefois	
les	généraliser.	
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I.  Introduction
The	 issue	 of	 whether	 same-sex	 couples	 should	 be	 able	 to	 enter	 into	marriage	 or	 an	 equivalent	 institution	 has	 been	 addressed	 in	 many	jurisdictions	 in	 the	 past	 two	 decades.	 Those	 legal	 systems	 that	 have	
either	created	some	form	of	legally-recognized	same-sex	partnership	or	opened	
the	existing	institution	of	marriage	to	such	couples,	have	each	faced	difficult	
legal	 questions.	 One	 such	 question	 concerns	 whether	 or	 not	 government-
employed	or	government-authorized	persons	(referred	to	here	generically	as	
“marriage	officers”	when	not	referencing	a	particular	jurisdiction)	may	refuse	
to	participate	in	the	formalization	of	a	same-sex	union	for	religious	reasons.	
On	the	one	hand,	it	may	be	argued	that	states	should	respect	the	religious	and	
conscientious	scruples	of	 their	citizens	and	should	not	discriminate	against	
marriage	 officers	 who	 claim	 that	 their	 religious	 convictions	 prevent	 them	
from	conducting	marriages	or	civil	unions	between	same-sex	couples.	On	the	
other	hand,	it	may	be	argued	that	allowing	state	employees	to	refuse	to	do	so	
perpetuates	the	very	discrimination	that	the	institutionalization	of	same-sex	
unions	aims	to	abolish.
This	 article	 compares	 the	different	 attempts	 at	 resolving	 this	 conflict	 in	
four	jurisdictions:	the	Netherlands,	South	Africa,	Scotland,	and	Canada.	The	
primary	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	analyze	both	the	nature	of	the	complexities	
which	 arise	 in	 each	 jurisdiction	 as	 they	 attempt	 to	 resolve	 the	 conflict,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 using	 arguments	 concerning	 discrimination	 and	
accommodation	 in	order	 to	 seek	such	resolution.	We	will	also	discuss	how	
these	issues	reflect	the	complexity	of	the	larger	issue	of	whether	and	how	to	
extend	legal	recognition	to	formalized	same-sex	couples.	This	discussion	will	
shed	some	light	on	the	more	general	issue	of	the	ability	to	transplant	the	legal	
resolutions	from	one	jurisdiction	to	another.	
The	selected	jurisdictions	were	chosen	based	on	the	areas	in	which	each	of	
the	authors	have	conducted	their	research.	These	jurisdictions	provide	a	useful	
context	in	which	to	situate	a	comparative	analysis	both	because	of	their	legal	
and	social	similarities,	as	well	as	the	differences	which	are	not	immediately	
apparent.	From	a	legal	perspective	all	four	jurisdictions	have	reputations	for	
being	progressive	and	each	has	its	roots	in	some	European	tradition.	In	South	
Africa,	however,	the	Roman-Dutch	common	law	is	accompanied	by	customary	
law,	which	may	carry	 less	 legal	weight,	but	may	be	more	 influential	 in	 the	
lives	of	a	greater	proportion	of	the	population.	Our	chosen	jurisdictions	are	all	
places	where	there	is	legal	acceptance	of	homosexuality5	(decriminalization,	
protection	 from	 discrimination,	 relationship	 recognition)	 despite	 having	
5	 	We	deal	only	with	what	might	be	called	“traditional”	homosexuals:	gay	men	and	lesbians.	Going	beyond	
these	categories	would	of	course	add	yet	another	layer	of	complexity	to	the	study.
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differing	 degrees	 of	 social	 hostility	 towards	 it.	 They	 are	 all	 places	 where,	
because	of	 immigration	or	political	changes	or	both,	there	is	some	social	or	
political	flux	 in	progress.	As	well,	 the	 jurisdictions	are	sufficiently	different	
so	 as	 to	 generate	 questions	 about	 the	 ability	 to	 transport	 legal	 analyses	 or	
solutions	to	such	socio-legal	issues	across	jurisdictions.	
The	specific	legal	system	in	each	jurisdiction	is	in	fact	different:	a	common	
law	 system	with	 civilian	 roots	 in	 Scotland;	 Roman-Dutch	 common	 law	 in	
South	Africa;	civil	law	in	the	Netherlands;	a	mixture	of	the	English	common	
law	and	the	French	civil	law	in	Canada.	Different	also	have	been	the	various	
responses	to	the	common	problem	–	how	to	accommodate	same-sex	couples	
within	 a	 system	of	 family	 regulation	 that	 seeks	 to	 avoid	discrimination	on	
the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.	The	basic	concepts	are	often	the	same	but	the	
history	 of	 legal	 developments	 affecting	 this	 issue	 is	 quite	 different	 in	 each	
jurisdiction.	 The	way	 in	which	 homosexuality	 and	 religious	 expression	 or	
ideas	 are	 legally	 protected	 in	 each	 jurisdiction	 is	 different.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	
the	 legal	 issue	 concerning	 the	accommodation	of	 each	must	be	 resolved	 in	
harmony	with	other	historical	legal	developments	in	the	given	jurisdiction.	
To	a	certain	extent,	 then,	 this	paper	 is	a	critique	of	 the	assumption	 that	
legal	solutions	to	these	(and	similar)	issues	can	simply	be	transported	across	
borders	to	somewhat	similar	jurisdictions.	The	underlying	issues	that	make	
this	 simple	 transport	 complicated	 or	 impossible	 will	 be	 evident	 from	 the	
discussion	here.	A	signal	service	of	comparative	analysis	is	to	problematize	easy	
and	adoptive	solutions,	however	the	main	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	investigate	
which	 concepts,	 analyses,	 and	 solutions	 can	 transcend	 the	 boundaries	
between	somewhat	similar	jurisdictions.	The	determination	of	which	lessons	
and	approaches	might	be	adopted	or	adapted	by	the	jurisdictions	in	question	
is	also	an	important	aspect	of	a	comparative	legal	analysis	such	as	this	one.
Our	primary	 concern	 is	not	 the	 ability	of	 religious	officials	 to	 refuse	 to	
conduct	 same-sex	marriages	within	 their	 religious	 institutions	 or	 contexts.	
We	 accept	 (and,	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 not	much	disputed)	 that	 religious	 institutions	
are	 entitled	 to	 conduct	 (or	 not	 conduct)	marriages	 according	 to	 their	 own	
tenets	and	doctrines.	We	focus,	rather,	on	civil	servants	(or	their	equivalents)	
who	 act	 as	 marriage	 officers	 and	 who	 object	 to	 participating	 in	 the	 legal	
institutionalization	of	same-sex	unions.
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II.    Background: The Religious Associations of Marriage
Marriage	 is	 an	 institution	 laden	 with	 symbolism	 and	 deep	 social	
importance.	 	Though	 the	historical	 association	of	 religion	 in	 the	 institution	
of	marriage	 is	 common	 in	 each	 of	 the	 jurisdictions	 being	 considered	 here,	
there	are	different	assumptions	about	the	degree	to	which	religious	ideology	
may	 inform	 legal	 issues	 relating	 to	marriage,	 including	 its	 very	definition.	
Moreover,	for	many	people	and	in	most	societies	the	institution	of	marriage	
remains	linked	with	religious	norms.6
A.	The	Netherlands
The	Netherlands,	where	marriage	–	 legally-speaking	at	 least	–	has	been	
an	exclusively	civil	affair	since	1795,7	is,	among	the	considered	jurisdictions,	
the	 one	where	 religious	 bodies	 have	 least	 influence	 over	 the	 institution	 of	
marriage.	This	is	probably	due	to	the	fact	that	Calvinism,	the	major	religious	
tradition	 in	 the	 country,	 did	 not	 regard	 marriage	 as	 a	 sacrament,	 but	 as	
primarily	 a	 secular	 issue.	Marriages	 officiated	 by	 religious	 representatives	
lack	 legal	 effect	 and	 religious	 weddings	 prior	 to	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	 civil	
legal	marriage	are	forbidden.	A	religious	representative	who	performs	such	
a	premature	religious	wedding	may	be	criminally	sanctioned.8	Nevertheless,	
marrying	 couples	 often	 have	 religious	 ceremonies	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	
the	 civil	 ceremony.	Despite	 this	 long	 history	 of	 secularization	 of	marriage,	
providing	religious	marriages	with	legal	effect	has	been	frequently	debated	
and	 re-considered,	most	 recently	 in	 2001.9	Although	 secular	 authority	 over	
the	 institution	 of	 marriage	 has	 prevailed,	 the	 wish	 to	 reintegrate	 religion	
into	 marriage	 ceremonies	 persists	 in	 some	 quarters,	 carrying	 potentially	
detrimental	consequences	for	same-sex	couples.	
B.	South	Africa
In	1652	the	laws	of	Holland	(which	was	at	the	time	a	province	of	what	is	now	
the	Netherlands)	were	transported	into	South	Africa	by	colonial	occupation.	
At	that	time,	marriages	were	preceded	by	the	publication	of	banns	and	could	
6	 	Robert	Leckey,	“Profane	Matrimony”	(2006)	21	CJLS	1.
7	 	L	Westerhof,	“Civiel	effect	voor	het	kerkelijk	huwelijk?”	[Legal	Effect	for	the	Church	Marriage?]	(2002)	
77	NJB	80.
8	 	Art	1:68	BW	(Burgerlijk	Wetboek)	[Dutch	Civil	Code].
9	 	See	Netherlands,	Tweede	Kamer,	Kamerstukken	II,	Vergaderjaar	2001-2002,	28078	Burgerlijk	huwelijk	en	
kerkelijk	huwelijk	[Civil	Marriage	and	Church	Marriage],	No	1	“Brief	van	de	Staatssecretaris	van	Justitie”	
[Letter	of	the	Deputy	Minister	of	Justice]	(5	November	2001).	It	is	quite	telling	that	in	the	Netherlands,	
religious	marriage	is	still	referred	to	as	“church	marriage”.
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be	concluded	either	in	a	church	or	by	a	magistrate.10	Civil	marriage	before	a	
state	official	was	introduced	in	South	Africa	in	1804.	Subsequently	there	were	
periods	when	marriages	were	concluded	only	in	churches,	as	well	as	other	brief	
periods	when	marriage	was	 concluded	only	by	 secular	 authorities.	Mostly,	
and	with	small	variations	between	the	four	territories	and	states	which	would	
eventually	 form	South	Africa	 in	1910,	marriages	could	be	concluded	either	
by	 religious	 or	 state	 authorities.11	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	Marriage	 Act,	 196112	
standardized	the	different	marriage	laws	in	the	four	provinces.	The	current	
position	is	that	marriages	can	be	conducted	either	by	state	functionaries,	or	by	
religious	officials	who	comply	with	the	statutory	requirements.13	
The	influence	of	Christianity	on	the	legal	definition	and	consequences	of	
marriage	in	South	Africa	was	manifest	in	various	rules	such	as	the	prohibition	
of	marriages	between	people	who	had	committed	adultery	with	one	another,14	
or	the	refusal	to	recognize	the	validity	of	Islamic	marriages	on	the	basis	that	
they	were	“potentially	polygamous”.15	The	picture	is	further	complicated	by	
the	historical	and	contemporary	recognition	of	traditional	African	marriages,16	
although	 these	 marriages	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	 lower	 status17	 than	 civil	
marriages	 in	 terms	of	 the	Marriage	Act,	1961.	Many	of	 the	explicitly	 Judeo-
Christian	 features	of	civil	marriage	have	since	been	removed	and	therefore	
civil	 marriage	 can	 no	 longer	 simply	 be	 equated	 with	 religious	 marriage;	
however,	 some	 religious	overtones	 remain,	 such	as	 the	 insistence	 that	 civil	
marriage	must	be	monogamous.	In	fact,	the	creation	of	separate	legislation	to	
cater	for	same-sex	marriage	is	arguably	motivated	by	the	desire	to	maintain	
a	 form	of	marriage	which	would	be	acceptable	 to	 the	Christian	majority	 in	
South	Africa.
10	 	As	a	result	of	the	Political	Ordinance	of	the	States	of	Holland,	adopted	in	1580.	For	a	historical	overview,	
see	HR	Hahlo,	The	South	African	Law	of	Husband	and	Wife,	5th	ed	(Cape	Town:	Juta,	2005)	ch	1.
11	 	See	June	D	Sinclair	&	Jacqueline	Heaton,	The	Law	of	Marriage:	Based	on	H.R.	Hahlo,	the	South	African	Law	
of	Husband	and	Wife,	vol	1	(Cape	Town:	Juta,	1995)	ch	2.
12	 	(S	Afr),	No	25	of	1961.
13	 	Sections	2-10	of	the	Marriage	Act,	1961,	ibid,	deal	with	the	appointment	of	marriage	officers	and	sections	
12,	22,	24-30	set	out	the	requirements	for	a	valid	marriage.	In	addition,	the	common	law	also	regulates	
other	aspects	of	the	capacity	to	marry.	
14	 	Cloete	v	Resident	Magistrate	of	Elliot,	1914	CPD	1075.	The	Appellate	Division	in	Green	v	Fitzgerald,	1914	AD	
88,	however,	declared	that	adultery	was	no	longer	a	crime.
15	 	Ismail	v	Ismail,	1983	(1)	SA	1006	(A).
16	 	Currently	enabled	by	the	Recognition	of	Customary	Marriages	Act,	1998	(S	Afr),	No	120	of	1998.
17	 	Likhapha	Mbatha,	Najma	Moosa	&	Elsje	Bonthuys,	“Culture	and	Religion”	in	Elsje	Bonthuys	&	Catherine	
Albertyn,	eds,	Gender,	Law	and	Justice	(Cape	Town:	Juta,	2007)	158.
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C.	Scotland
Scotland	retained	a	closer	connection	between	faith	and	marriage	despite	
having	somewhat	similar	connections	to	Calvin	as	existed	in	the	Netherlands	
and	 South	Africa.	 The	 reason	 was	 that,	 after	 the	 Reformation,	 canon	 law	
remained	the	 law	of	 the	 land	except	 insofar	as	 it	was	 inconsistent	with	 the	
reformed	 faith,	 and	 no	 such	 inconsistency	 was	 perceived	 in	 continuing	
the	 tradition	 of	 church	 ministers	 solemnizing	 marriages.	 Marriage	 could	
be	 solemnized	 in	 Scotland	 only	 by	 religious	 ceremony	 until	 1940,	 when	
the	Marriage	 (Scotland)	 Act	 1939	 came	 into	 force,	 permitting	 civil	marriage	
celebrated	 by	 a	 secular	 state	 official,	 in	 addition	 to	 religiously	 conducted	
marriage.18	 	 The	 dominant	 Church	 of	 Scotland’s	 (“the	 Kirk’s”)	 doctrinal	
interpretations	 of	 scripture	 continued	 to	 influence	 the	 law’s	 conception	 of	
marriage	and	how	it	should	be	controlled,	well	into	the	20th	century.19	
D.	Canada
Distrust	among	the	four	original	Canadian	provinces,	in	particular	between	
the	 French-speaking	 (largely	 Catholic)	 and	 the	 English-speaking	 (largely	
Protestant)	provinces,	over	the	role	of	religion	in	marriage	and,	particularly,	
divorce20	 was	 so	 fundamental	 that	 it	 influenced	 Canada’s	 constitutional	
division	 of	 powers	 in	 1867.21	 The	 result	 is	 that	 the	 federal	 government	
defines	marriage,22	 but	 the	provinces	 are	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 solemnization	 of	
marriage.23	That	is	to	say,	the	provinces	(and	territories)	decide	how	marriages	
are	conducted	-	including	who	is	authorized	to	perform	them.	Currently,	all	
Canadian	jurisdictions	recognize	most	religious	marriages	without	the	need	
for	 a	 separate	 state	 ceremony,	 although	 the	 provinces	 still	 issue	 marriage	
licences.	In	addition,	the	provinces	(and	territories)	facilitate	the	performance	
of	secular	or	civil	marriages.
18	 	After	the	Reformation	the	celebration	of	marriage	fell	within	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	the	Kirk	(the	
Established	church	in	Scotland),	but	the	Marriage	(Scotland)	Act,	1834	(UK),	4	&	5	Will	IV,	c	28,	permitted	
religious	celebrants	from	churches	other	than	the	Church	of	Scotland.	
19	 	See	Jane	Mair,	“Public	Ceremony	and	Private	Belief:	The	Role	of	Religion	in	the	Scots	Law	of	Marriage”	
[2007]	4	Jurid	Rev	279.
20	 	See	FJE	Jordan,	“The	Federal	Divorce	Act	(1968)	and	the	Constitution”	(1968)	14:2	McGill	LJ	209.
21	 	Constitution	Act,	1867	(UK),	30	&	31	Vict,	c	3,	reprinted	in	RSC	1985,	App	II,	No	5.
22	 	Ibid,	s	91(26).
23	 	Ibid,	s	92(12).
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III.    The Institutionalization of Same-Sex Unions
Each	 of	 the	 four	 jurisdictions	 under	 consideration	 here	 has	 in	 the	 past	
couple	 of	 decades	 dealt	 with	 demands	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 same-sex	
relationships	within	a	wider	context	of	providing	legal	recognition	to	family	
formations	outside	of	traditional	marriage.	As	a	result	of	the	different	 legal	
and	 social	 contexts	within	 these	 jurisdictions,	 there	have	been	 significantly	
varied	responses	to	these	demands.	
A.	The	Netherlands
The	 Netherlands	 introduced	 legally-recognized	 registered	 partnerships	
for	both	same	and	opposite-sex	couples	 in	1998.24	Other	 than	having	 fewer	
formalities	 for	dissolution,	 registered	partnerships	are	 legally	equivalent	 to	
marriage	and	can	easily	be	converted	into	marriage	or	vice	versa.25	Three	years	
later	same-sex	couples	gained	access	to	the	institution	of	marriage	itself26	and	
article	1:30(1)	of	the	Dutch	Civil	Code	now	explicitly	states:	“A	marriage	can	be	
entered	into	by	two	people	of	different	or	same	sex.”27
Ironically,	this	opening	up	of	marriage	to	same-sex	couples	provided	the	
impetus	 for	a	proposal	 to	 re-introduce	 legally-effective	 religious	marriages.	
GroenLinks,	a	left	wing	“green”	party,	proposed	to	lift	the	ban	on	marriages	
conducted	by	 religious	officials	 so	 as	 to	 accommodate	orthodox	Christians	
who	 strongly	 opposed	 the	 new	 legislation.28	 Like	 its	 predecessors,	 the	
proposal	did	not	get	much	support,	even	from	the	groups	which	it	intended	to	
24	 	Wet	van	5	juli	1997	tot	wijziging	van	Boek	1	van	het	Burgerlijk	Wetboek	en	van	het	Wetboek	van	Burgerlijke	
Rechtsvordering	in	verband	met	opneming	daarin	van	bepalingen	voor	het	geregistreerd	partnerschap	[Act	of	5	
July	1997	to	Amend	Book	1	of	the	Civil	Code	and	the	Code	of	Civil	Legal	Procedure	in	Connection	with	
the	Inclusion	of	Provisions	Regarding	Registered	Partnership],	Stb	1997,	324.	The	act	entered	into	force	
on	1	January	1998.
25	 	Katharina	Boele-Woelki	et	al,	Huwelijk	of	geregistreerd	partnerschap?:	Een	evaluatie	van	de	Wet	openstelling	
huwelijk	 en	 de	 Wet	 geregistreerd	 partnerschap	 in	 opdracht	 van	 het	 Ministerie	 van	 Justitie	 [Marriage	 or	
Registered	Partnership?:	An	Evaluation	of	 the	Act	Opening	Civil	Marriage	 to	Same-Sex	Couples	and	
the	Act	 Introducing	 Registered	 Partnership,	 Commissioned	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice]	 (The	Hague:	
Ministerie	 van	 Justitie,	 2006);	Kees	Waaldijk,	 ed,	More	 or	 Less	Together:	 Levels	 of	 Legal	Consequences	 of	
Marriage,	Cohabitation	 and	Registered	Partnership	 for	Different-Sex	 and	 Same-Sex	Partners:	A	Comparative	
Study	 of	 Nine	 European	 Countries	 (Paris:	 Institut	 national	 d’études	 démographiques,	 2004);	 I	 Curry-
Sumner,	“Private	International	Law	Aspects	of	Homosexual	Couples:	The	Netherlands	Report”,	online:	
(2007)	11.1	EJCL	8	<http://www.ejcl.org>.
26	 	Wet	van	21	december	2000	tot	wijziging	van	Boek	1	van	het	Burgerlijk	Wetboek	in	verband	met	de	openstelling	
van	het	huwelijk	voor	personen	van	hetzelfde	geslacht	[Act	of	21	December	2000	to	Amend	the	Civil	Code	in	
Connection	with	the	Opening	up	of	Marriage	for	Persons	of	the	Same	Sex],	Stb	2001,	9.
27	 	Dutch	Civil	Code,	supra	note	8,	art	1:30(1)	[translated	by	author].
28	 	Netherlands,	Tweede	Kamer,	Handelingen,	Vergaderjaar	2000-2001,	No	19	(7	November	2000)	1428-31.
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accommodate,	possibly	because	it	offered	no	real	solution	for	those	who	want	
to	see	the	institution	of	marriage	retained	for	only	opposite-sex	couples.29	
B.	Scotland
By	 way	 of	 contrast	 to	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	 same-sex	 couples	 are	
fully	 included	 in	 the	 institution	of	marriage,	 in	 Scotland	marriage	 remains	
the	 exclusive	 preserve	 of	 opposite-sex	 couples,	 while	 same-sex	 couples	
have	 exclusive	 access	 to	 an	 equivalent	 and	 entirely	 statutory	 institution.	
The	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004	adopts	what	might	be	called	an	“equivalence	
model”,	creating	an	institution	exclusively	for	same-sex	couples,	called	“civil	
partnership”.	Civil	partnership	is	equivalent	to,	but	separate	from,	the	existing	
institution	of	marriage	 that	 remains	exclusively	 for	opposite-sex	couples.	 30	
Civil	partnership	may	be	equivalent	to	marriage,	but	it	is,	quite	intentionally,	
an	entirely	secular	institution.	So,	for	instance,	registrars	do	not	“solemnize”	
civil	 partnerships,	 for	 that	 language	 brings	 to	 mind	 the	 solemnities	 of	
religious	ritual,	which	is	reserved	for	marriage.	Instead,	civil	partnerships	are	
“registered”	(even	though	many	do	so	in	the	course	of	individually	designed	
and	legally	non-sanctioned	ceremonies).	The	secularity	of	the	new	institution	
is	further	emphasized	by	the	rule	that	the	registration	may	occur	in	any	place	
in	Scotland,	 except	 any	place	 that	 is	or	has	been	used	 solely	or	mainly	 for	
religious	purposes.31
Both	in	Canada	and	South	Africa	the	recognition	of	same-sex	relationships	
was	preceded	by	Law	Commission	investigations	into	the	various	possibilities	
for	 giving	 legal	 effect	 to	 non-marital	 conjugal	 relationships,32	 which	 were	
overtaken	by	successful	constitutional	challenges	to	the	exclusively	opposite-
29	 	C.f.	Staatkundig	Gereformeerde	Partij,	Daad	bij	het	Woord:	De	SGP	stáát	ervoor!	Verkiezingsprogramma	SGP,	
2010-2014	[Act	by	the	Word:	The	SGP	Stands	for	It!	Political	Programme	of	the	Dutch	Calvinist	Party],	
online:	 SGP	 <http://www.sgp.nl/Media/download/19720/Verkiezingsprogramma%20SGP%202010-
2014.pdf>	(“God	himself	has	instituted	marriage,	meant	as	a	lifelong	union	between	man	and	woman.	
This	means	that	marriage	between	persons	of	the	same	sex	cannot	be	intended.”	[translated	by	author]	
at	10).
30	 	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004	(UK),	c	33.	See	Civil	Partnership:	A	Framework	for	the	Legal	Recognition	of	Same-
Sex	Couples	(London:	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry,	2003)	at	paras	2.7-2.8,	Annex	B;	Civil	Partnership	
Registration:	A	Legal	Status	 for	Committed	Same-Sex	Couples	 in	Scotland	 (Edinburgh:	Scottish	Executive,	
2003)	at	paras	5.7-5.8.
31	 	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004,	ibid,	s	93(3).	Curiously,	the	equivalent	rule	in	the	English	and	Welsh	part	of	the	
Civil	Partnership	Act	2004	(s	6)	was	modified	by	the	Equality	Act	2010	(UK),	c	15,	s	202,	and	authority	may	
be	given	to	register	civil	partnerships	in	religious	premises	in	England	and	Wales;	however,	even	in	that	
jurisdiction	religious	officiants	are	not	permitted.
32	 	See	Law	Commission	of	Canada,	Beyond	Conjugality:	Recognizing	 and	Supporting	Close	Personal	Adult	
Relationships	(Ottawa:	Minister	of	Public	Works	and	Government	Services,	2001);	British	Columbia	Law	
Institute,	Report	on	Recognition	of	Spousal	and	Family	Status	(Vancouver:	British	Columbia	Law	Institute,	
1998);	Report	on	Domestic	Partnerships,	South	African	Law	Reform	Commission,	Project	No	118	(March	
2006).	See	also	Thomas	G	Anderson,	“Models	of	Registered	Partnership	and	Their	Rationale:	The	British	
Columbia	Law	Institute’s	Proposed	Domestic	Partner	Act”	(2000)	17:1	Can	J	Fam	L	89.		
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sex	marital	 regime.33	 This,	 in	 turn,	 resulted	 in	 national	 legislation	 opening	
marriage	to	same-sex	couples.	
C.	South	Africa
The	 South	 African	 Civil	 Union	 Act,	 2006	 allows	 for	 the	 solemnization	
of	 civil	unions	between	 two	same-sex	or	opposite	 sex	partners,	 either	by	a	
religious	institution	or	by	a	state	official.34	The	provisions	relating	to	the	place	
and	 formalities	 for	 the	solemnization	of	 civil	unions	mirror	 those	applying	
to	marriage.	Additionally,	at	the	time	of	solemnization	the	“marriage	officer	
must	 inquire	 from	the	parties…whether	 their	 civil	union	should	be	known	
as	a	marriage	or	a	civil	partnership,”35	and	the	certificate	of	registration	will	
indicate	that	the	parties	have	either	entered	into	a	marriage	or	a	civil	union.36	
The	consequences	of	a	civil	union	are	exactly	on	par	with	those	of	marriage.37	
Thus,	 civil	 unions	 are	 institutions	 that	 share	 all	 of	 the	 characteristics	 and	
consequences	of	marriage;	they	can	even	be	registered	as	a	marriage,	though	
the	 existing	 marriage	 regime,	 which	 is	 limited	 to	 opposite-sex	 couples,	 is	
retained,	albeit	rather	clumsily.
D.	Canada
Before	 the	 adoption	 in	 2005	 of	 the	 Canadian	 Civil	 Marriage	 Act,	 two	
provinces	had	introduced	civil	unions	as	equivalent	institutions	to	marriage.38	
The	Civil	Code	 in	Quebec	was	amended	 in	2002	 to	create	 the	status	of	 civil	
union,	open	to	same-sex	and	opposite-sex	couples	and	mirroring	the	rights	
and	 obligations	 of	 spouses.39	 The	 more	 conservative	 province	 of	 Alberta	
33	 	The	most	important	Canadian	cases	were	EGALE	Canada	Inc	v	Canada	(Attorney	General),	2003	BCCA	251,	
225	DLR	(4th)	472,	rev’g	2001	BCSC	1365,	[2001]	11	WWR	685;	Halpern	v	Canada	(Attorney	General)	(2003),	
65	OR	(3d)	161,	225	DLR	(4th)	529	(CA),	aff’g	(2002),	60	OR	(3d)	321,	215	DLR	(4th)	223	(Sup	Ct	(Div	Ct))	
[Halpern	cited	to	OR];	Dunbar	v	Yukon	Territory,	2004	YKSC	54,	8	RFL	(6th)	235;	Vogel	v	Canada	(Attorney	
General)	(2004),	[2005]	5	WWR	154	(available	on	QL)	(Man	QB);	Boutilier	v	Nova	Scotia	(Attorney	General),	
[2004]	NSJ	No	357	(QL)	(SC);	W	(N)	v	Canada	(Attorney	General),	2004	SKQB	434,	246	DLR	(4th)	345;	Pottle	
v	Canada	(Attorney	General),	[2004]	NJ	No	470	(QL)	(NL	SC	(TD));	Harrison	et	al	v	Canada	(Attorney	General)	
et	al,	2005	NBQB	232,	290	NBR	(2d)	70	(TD).	In	South	Africa,	a	series	of	constitutional	challenges	to	legal	
discrimination	against	people	who	have	sex	with	others	of	the	same	sex	started	off	with	National	Coalition	
for	Gay	and	Lesbian	Equality	v	Minister	of	Justice,	[1998]	ZACC	15;	1999	1	SA	6	(CC);	1998	(12)	BCLR	1517	
(CC),	which	attacked	the	criminalization	of	sodomy,	and	culminated	in	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	v	Fourie,	
[2005]	ZACC	19;	2006	(1)	SA	524	(CC),	in	which	the	complete	failure	to	give	legal	recognition	to	same-sex	
relationships	was	declared	unconstitutional.
34	 	(S	Afr),	No	17	of	2006	[Civil	Union	Act].
35	 	Ibid,	s	11(1).
36	 	Ibid,	s	12(3).
37	 	Ibid,	s	13.
38	 	SC	2005,	c	33.
39	 	SQ	1991,	c	64;	see	arts	521.1-521.19.
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passed	the	Adult	Interdependent	Relationships	Act	in	an	attempt	(albeit	a	vain	
one)	both	to	pre-empt	federal	legislation	allowing	same-sex	couples	entry	into	
marriage,	and	to	preserve	the	existing	limits	of	accessibility	to	marriage.	40
The	impact	of	these	provincial	statutes	and	the	expansion	to	other	provinces	
of	such	approaches	have	now	been	pre-empted	by	court	cases	 that	opened	
civil	marriage	 to	 same-sex	 couples	and	by	 the	2005	 federal	 statute.	Typical	
of	the	reasons	in	the	court	cases	are	those	from	the	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal.	
The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	exclusion	of	same-sex	couples	from	marriage	
“denies	persons	 in	 same-sex	 relationships	 a	 fundamental	 choice	 –	whether	
or	not	 to	marry	 their	partner”.41	 	The	Court	accepted	that	 the	common	law	
recognized	only	opposite-sex	couples	as	capable	of	marrying,	but	held	that	
“marriage”	did	not	have	a	constitutionally	fixed	meaning.	The	Court	said,	“an	
argument	that	marriage	is	heterosexual	because	it	‘just	is’	amounts	to	circular	
reasoning.”42		
The	Civil	Marriage	Act,	passed	in	response	to	both	of	these	cases	as	well	
as	political	 pressure,	 is	 clear,	 stating:	 “[m]arriage,	 for	 civil	 purposes,	 is	 the	
lawful	union	of	two	persons	to	the	exclusion	of	all	others”	and	“[f]or	greater	
certainty,	a	marriage	is	not	void	or	voidable	by	reason	only	that	the	spouses	
are	of	the	same	sex.”43	 It	 is	worthy	of	note	that	the	change	of	the	definition	
of	 marriage	 in	 Canada	 does	 not	 differentiate	 between	 religious	 and	 civil	
marriage	and	 therefore	 contemplates	 the	availability	of	 religious	marriages	
for	same-sex	couples	as	well	as	for	opposite-sex	couples.
To	summarize	the	various	legal	regimes:	in	the	Netherlands,	both	same	and	
opposite-sex	couples	can	either	marry	or	enter	into	registered	partnerships.	In	
Canada,	the	institution	of	marriage	is	open	either	to	same-sex	or	opposite-sex	
couples	and	some	provinces	offer	a	civil	union-type	alternative	to	both	types	
of	 partnerships.	 South	Africa	 retains	 opposite-sex	 only	 marriage,	 but	 also	
has	civil	unions,	which	are	open	to	same	or	opposite-sex	couples	and	which	
may	be	called	marriage	if	the	partners	so	wish.	Only	in	Scotland	is	there	no	
institution	 open	 to	 both	 categories	 of	 partners,	with	marriage	 reserved	 for	
opposite-sex	couples	and	civil	partnership	reserved	for	same-sex	couples.	44
40	 	SA	2002,	c	A-4.5.
41	 	Halpern,	supra	note	33	at	para	87.
42	 	Ibid	at	para	71.
43	 	Supra	note	38,	ss	2,	4.	The	constitutional	validity	of	the	Civil	Marriage	Act	was	confirmed	in	Reference	re	
Same-Sex	Marriage,	2004	SCC	79,	[2004]	3	SCR	698.		
44	 	The	major	technical	complexity	caused	by	this	insistence	on	gender-mix	exclusivity	concerns	transgender	
individuals	who	seek	to	have	their	new	gender	recognized	while	in	a	marriage	or	civil	partnership.	The	
Gender	Recognition	Act	2004	(UK),	2004,	c	7,	requires	the	termination	of	the	existing	relationship,	followed	
by	the	recognition	of	the	new	gender,	leaving	the	person	free	to	enter	the	other	type	of	relationship	with	
his	or	her	partner.
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IV.    Conducting Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Marriages
A.	The	Netherlands
In	 the	 Netherlands	 secular	 marriage	 ceremonies	 and	 the	 registration	
of	 registered	partnerships	 are	 the	 tasks	 of	 civil	 servants	who	work	 for	 the	
Registrar’s	 Office	 (Burgerlijke	 Stand);	 however,	 in	 practice	 the	 ceremonial	
part	of	the	marriage	is	often	conducted	by	people	who	may	or	may	not	work	
for	 the	government	but	who	are	 in	any	case	sworn	 in	 just	 to	carry	out	 this	
ceremonial	function	on	a	kind	of	stand-by	contract.	A	person	carrying	out	this	
latter	function	is	known	as	a	“special	civil	servant	of	the	Registry”.		
Municipalities	are	obliged	to	ensure	that	all	couples	who	wish	to	marry	
are	able	to	do	so,	but	they	have	some	scope	of	discretion	concerning	the	local	
practice	and	execution	of	these	obligations.	For	instance,	some	municipalities	
prefer	to	send	only	special	civil	servants	to	officiate	marriages.	Others	publish	
the	names	of	all	available	regular	and	special	civil	servants	on	their	websites,	
accompanied	 by	 a	 resume,	 a	 photo,	 and	 sometimes	 information	 on	 their	
private	life,	hobbies,	or	their	(non)religious	affiliations.	There	have	been	cases	
where	the	(un)willingness	to	officiate	same-sex	marriages	has	been	explicitly	
mentioned.45
Despite	the	absence	of	a	provision	allowing	marriage	officers	to	object	to	
performing	same-sex	marriages,	in	2011	there	were	approximately	105	objecting	
civil	 servants	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 employed	 by	 58	different	municipalities;	
however,	72%	of	the	municipalities	have	indicated	that	they	are	not	willing	
to	 countenance	 these	 objections	 (so-called	 weigervrije	 gemeenten)	 and	 234	
municipalities	hire	new	servants	only	on	condition	 that	 they	are	willing	 to	
perform	all	marriages.46
This	 refusal,	 at	 the	 municipal	 level,	 to	 allow	 for	 such	 conscientious	
objections	has	caused	job	seekers	and	employees	to	file	complaints	with	the	
Dutch	national	equality	body	(Commissie	Gelijke	Behandeling,	the	“CGB”).	This	
body	is	tasked	with	investigating	discrimination	complaints	and	may	release	
non-binding,	 but	 socially	 persuasive	 findings	 on	 the	 discrimination	 issues.	
The	complaints	have	been	made	on	the	basis	that	the	municipal	employers,	
by	not	appointing,	or	by	refusing	to	renew	the	contracts	of	objecting	officials,	
discriminate	against	them	on	the	basis	of	religion.
45	 	See	 e.g.	 the	website	of	 the	municipality	of	Staphorst:	 “Buitengewone	ambtenaren	burgerlijke	 stand”	
[Special	Officials	Registry],	 online:	Gemeente	 Staphorst	<http://www.staphorst.nl/index.php?simact
ion=content&mediumid=1&pagid=1000>	 (two	of	 the	five	 special	 civil	 servants	 explicitly	 refer	 to	 the	
importance	of	marriage	as	a	union	between	‘man	and	woman’).	
46	 	“Inventarisatie	trouwbeleid”	[Inventory	of	Marriage	Policies],	online:	COC	Nederland	<http://www.
coc.nl/dopage.pl?thema=any&pagina=algemeen&algemeen_id=407>	(statistics	as	of	25	May	2011).
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The	effect	of	the	equality	legislation	on	the	employer-employee	relationship,	
therefore,	stands	at	the	centre	of	these	disputes	in	the	Netherlands.	The	act	of	
officiating	at	a	marriage	is	legally	regarded	as	a	“unilateral”	act	of	government.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	 such	 acts	 typically	 belong	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 legislator	 or	
the	administration,	comparable	to	the	levying	of	taxes.	Such	acts	have	been	
deliberately	 left	outside	of	 the	scope	of	 the	equal	 treatment	 legislation	 that	
focuses	on	relationships	between	citizens,	and	not	between	the	government	
and	its	citizens.	So,	couples	will	usually	not	know	that	an	official	refused	to	
marry	 them	because	 they	 apply	 to	 the	municipality,	which	 in	 turn	 assigns	
a	 civil	 servant.	 Regardless,	 even	 if	 the	 couple	were	 to	 know	of	 the	 refusal	
by	a	particular	civil	servant,	this	would	not	engage	the	equality	legislation	if	
another	official	is	willing	to	conduct	the	marriage.47	
B.	Scotland
The	Church	of	Scotland’s	pre-eminent	position	in	Scottish	society	means	
that	Kirk	ministers	are,	by	dint	of	their	office,	state	officials	for	the	purposes	
of	solemnizing	religious	marriages,48	while	it	is	required	that	celebrants	from	
other	religious	organizations	first	be	authorized	to	solemnize	marriages.49	Non-
religious,	or	civil,	marriages	may	be	conducted	only	by	district	 registrars.50	
There	 is	 no	 obligation	 upon	ministers	 of	 the	Church	 of	 Scotland	 to	marry	
anyone	within	their	parish	and	a	minister	is	free	to	refuse	to	do	so.	Registrars,	
on	the	other	hand,	are	state	officials	and	as	such	are	not	able	to	refuse	to	marry	
any	couple	who	are	legally	free	to	marry	each	other.
Registrars	are	employed	by	local	councils	who	set	their	terms	of	employment	
and	 their	 range	 of	 duties,	 which	 may	 include	 registering	 marriages,	 civil	
partnerships,	births,	and	deaths.	Councils	with	larger	geographical	areas	and	
less	dense	populations	charge	their	Registrars	with	a	larger	variety	of	work,	
whereas	in	cities	the	Registrars	tend	to	specialize	in	registration	duties	alone.	
The	purely	 secular	nature	 of	 Scottish	 civil	 partnerships	mean	 that	 they	
may	be	registered	only	by	district	registrars	and	that	religious	officers	have	no	
legal	role	in	bringing	civil	partnerships	into	being.	Registrars	are	authorized	
by	the	Registrar	General	of	Scotland,	who	must	ensure	that	there	are	sufficient	
47	 	A	very	explicit	refusal,	either	directed	at	a	specific	couple	or	advertised	in	general	on	the	internet	might	
come	within	the	ambit	of	arts	137(c)-(g)	SR	(Wetboek	van	Strafrecht)	[Dutch	Criminal	Code];	however,	no	
cases	have	followed	this	route	yet.
48	 	Marriage	(Scotland)	Act	1977	(UK),	1977,	c	15,	s	8(1)(a)(i).
49	 	Ibid,	ss	8(1)(a)(ii),	9.
50	 	Ibid,	s	8(1)(b).	A	qualification	to	this	is	that	the	Registrar	General	of	Scotland	has	authorized	humanists	
to	solemnize	marriage	on	the	same	basis	as	he	authorizes	non-Church	of	Scotland	religious	officiants	to	
do	so.
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registrars	 available	 to	 conduct	 civil	 partnerships	 throughout	 the	 country.51	
The	 local	 demand	 for	 registrars	 who	 will	 conduct	 civil	 partnerships	 and	
marriages	is	assessed	by	the	local	authorities,	who	must	ensure	that	there	are	
enough	 registrars	 so	 authorized	 in	 their	 area	 to	meet	 the	demand.	Despite	
calls	 for	 it	 to	do	so,	 the	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004	contains	no	conscientious	
objection	 provision.	 Nevertheless,	 registrars	 have	 argued	 that	 by	 forcing	
them	to	conduct	civil	partnerships	the	local	authorities	thereby	violate	their	
right	to	religious	beliefs	under	article	9	of	the	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	
Human	Rights	 and	Fundamental	Freedoms,52	 and	under	EU-inspired	domestic	
legislation.53	The	issue	is	thus	whether,	in	the	absence	of	an	explicit	conscience	
clause,	 the	 employing	 local	 authorities	 have	 a	 legal	 obligation	 to	 allow	 an	
objector	to	be	relieved	of	the	duty	to	register	civil	partnerships	where	there	are	
sufficient	numbers	of	registrars	willing	to	assume	the	duty	instead.	As	in	the	
Netherlands,	objecting	officials	have	cast	their	claims	in	terms	of	employment	
law.54	
C.	Canada
In	 Canada,	 the	 provinces	 have	 different	 regimes	 relating	 to	 the	
appointment	of	people	who	can	conduct	same	or	opposite-sex	civil	marriages.	
There	 are	 also	 different	 names	 for	 the	 individuals	 authorized	 to	 perform	
them.55	 Different	 solutions	 were	 adopted	 by	 the	 different	 jurisdictions,	
regarding	the	issue	of	refusing	marriage	commissioners.56	Some	decided	that	
marriage	 commissioners	 would	 have	 to	 indicate	 a	 willingness	 to	 perform	
such	ceremonies	or	else	resign	their	positions.	Others	permitted	refusals	on	
51	 	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004,	supra	note	30,	s	87,	mirroring	Marriage	(Scotland)	Act	1977,	supra	note	44,	s	17.
52	 	4	November	1950,	213	UNTS	221,	Eur	TS	5	[European	Convention].
53	 See	 Employment	 Equality	 (Religion	 or	 Belief)	 Regulations	 2003,	 SI	 2003/1660	 [Employment	 Equality	
Regulations]	(designed	to	implement	EC	Council	Directive	2000/78/EC	of	27	November	2000	establishing	a	
general	framework	for	equal	treatment	in	employment	and	occupation,	[2000]	OJ,	L	303/16;	now	replaced	by	
the	far	more	comprehensive	Equality	Act	2010,	supra	note	31).
54	 	See	Islington	London	Borough	Council	v	Ladele,	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	1357,	[2010]	ICR	532	[Ladele];	McClintock	
v	Department	of	Constitutional	Affairs	(2007),	[2008]	IRLR	29	(available	on	BAILII)	[McClintock]	(both	cases	
discussed	in	Andrew	Hambler,	“A	No-Win	Situation	for	Public	Officials	with	Faith	Convictions”	(2010)	
12:1	Ecc	LJ	3);	McFarlane	v	Relate	(Avon)	Ltd,	[2010]	EWCA	Civ	880,	[2010]	IRLR	872	[McFarlane].	
55	 In	 Ontario,	 for	 example,	 judges,	 justices	 of	 the	 peace	 and	municipal	 clerks	 can	 perform	marriages,	
but	 are	not	 called	marriage	 commissioners:	Marriage	Act,	RSO	1990,	 c	M.3,	 s	 24.	 See	Solemnization	 of	
Marriage	Act,	RSNS	1989,	c	436,	s	4	(certain	judges);	art	366	CCQ	(e.g.	clerk	or	deputy	clerk	of	the	Superior	
Court).	Newfoundland	and	Labrador	and	the	western	Canadian	jurisdictions	have	specially-designated	
marriage	commissioners:	Marriage	Act,	RSA	2000,	c	M-5,	s	3;	Marriage	Act,	RSBC	1996,	c	282,	s	7;	The	
Marriage	Act,	RSM	1987,	c	M50,	s	7;	Solemnization	of	Marriage	Act,	RSNL	1990,	c	S-19,	s	3;	Marriage	Act,	
RSNWT	1988,	c	M-4,	s	7;	The	Marriage	Act,	1995,	SS	1995,	c	M-4.1,	s	3;	Marriage	Act,	RSY	2002,	c	146,	s	5.	
56	 These	 solutions	 generally	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 informally	 and	 not	 always	 consistently	 adopted.	 See	
Bruce	MacDougall,	“Refusing	to	Officiate	at	Same-Sex	Civil	Marriages”	(2006),	69	Sask	Law	Rev	351,	at	
fn.	11.
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the	 basis	 of	 religion	 or	 conscience.57	 Still	 others	 took	what	might	 be	 called	
a	middle-ground	approach	and	permitted	opt-outs	only	where	the	marriage	
commissioners	 could	 provide	 a	 replacement.	 Yet	 another	 middle-ground	
approach	was	to	allow	opt-outs	for	existing	marriage	commissioners,	while	
exclusively	appointing	as	new	marriage	commissioners	only	those	who	will	
agree	to	marry	same-sex	couples.	There	also	exists	a	“single	entry	point”	system	
where	marriage	commissioners	are	not	contacted	directly	by	members	of	the	
public	but	 instead	 through	a	 central	office.	By	centralizing	 the	process,	 the	
religious	beliefs	of	individual	marriage	commissioners	can	be	accommodated	
“behind	the	scenes”,	much	as	is	the	case	in	the	Netherlands.58	The	method	of	
implementing	these	approaches	varies	by	jurisdiction,	with	some	being	very	
casually	implemented,	it	would	seem.59	
The	 Canadian	 federal	 Civil	 Marriage	 Act	 does	 not,	 for	 constitutional	
jurisdiction	 reasons,	 regulate	 the	 performance	 of	 marriage	 ceremonies.	
Nonetheless,	section	3.1	was	added	late	in	the	drafting	process	of	that	statute	
and	states	that:	
[N]o	person	or	organization	shall	be	deprived	of	any	benefit,	or	be	subject	 to	any	
obligation	or	sanction,	under	any	law	of	the	Parliament	of	Canada	solely	by	reason	
of	 their	 exercise,	 in	 respect	 of	marriage	 between	 persons	 of	 the	 same	 sex,	 of	 the	
freedom	of	conscience	and	religion	guaranteed	under	the	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	
and	Freedoms	or	the	expression	of	their	beliefs	in	respect	of	marriage	as	the	union	of	
a	man	and	woman	to	the	exclusion	of	all	others	based	on	that	guaranteed	freedom.
D.	South	Africa
In	 South	 Africa,	 the	 Marriage	 Act,	 1961	 dictates	 that	 marriages	 can	
be	 performed	 either	 by	 religious	 officials	 or	 by	 public	 servants,	 who	 are	
automatically	 deemed	marriage	 officers	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 occupation.60	 In	
addition,	marriages	can	also	be	conducted	by	officers	of	certain	religions	who	
have	been	appointed	as	marriage	officers	by	the	State.61	Religious	marriage	
officers	may	 object	 to	 conducting	marriages	which	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 the	
tenets,	 doctrines,	 or	 disciplines	 of	 their	 religions.62	 For	 instance,	 Catholic	
marriage	 officers	 who	 solemnize	 marriages	 in	 their	 capacity	 as	 religious	
57	 	See	the	Prince	Edward	Island	Marriage	Act,	RSPEI	1988,	c	M-3	s	11.1,	as	amended	by	An	Act	to	Amend	the	
Marriage	Act,	SPEI	2005,	c	12,	s	7	[Marriage	Act	(PEI)].	New	Brunswick	proposed	similar	legislation:	Bill	
76,	An	Act	to	Amend	the	Marriage	Act,	2nd	Sess,	55th	Leg,	New	Brunswick,	2005.	
58	 	See	Reference	re	Marriage	Commissioners	Appointed	Under	The	Marriage	Act,	1995	(Sask),	2011	SKCA	3	at	
para	85,	327	DLR	(4th)	669	[Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference].	
59	 	Only	one	jurisdiction,	Prince	Edward	Island,	has	a	statute	on	this	matter:	Marriage	Act	(PEI),	supra	note	
57,	s	11.1.	The	other	jurisdictions	simply	use	policy	statements.
60	 	Marriage	Act,	1961,	supra	note	12,	ss	2-3.	
61	 	Ibid,	s	3(1).
62	 	Ibid,	s	31.
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marriage	officers	may	object	to	conducting	marriages	between	persons	who	
have	 been	 divorced,	while	 certain	 Jewish	marriage	 officers	 could	 object	 to	
conducting	marriages	 between	 Jews	 and	 non-Jews.	 Conversely,	 no	 similar	
conscientious	objection	provision	exists	for	public	officials	who	are	marriage	
officers,	 therefore	 they	must	conduct	all	marriages,	 regardless	of	 their	own	
beliefs.
The	 position	 is	 different	 for	 civil	 unions	 in	 South	Africa.	 In	 respect	 of	
religious	marriage	officers,	the	Civil	Union	Act	requires	first,	that	a	religious	
denomination	or	organization	apply	 for	approval	 to	conduct	 civil	unions.63	
Once	the	organization	has	been	approved,	an	official	from	the	organization	
may	apply	to	be	appointed	as	a	marriage	officer.	Once	religious	organizations	
have	obtained	permission	to	conduct	civil	unions,	religious	officers	no	longer	
have	 statutory	 rights	 of	 conscientious	 objection	 on	 theological	 grounds.64	
This	contrasts	with	 the	position	of	 religious	marriage	officers	who	conduct	
heterosexual	 marriages	 under	 the	Marriage	 Act,	 1961.	 They	 may	 object	 to	
conducting	marriages	which	do	not	conform	to	the	“rites,	formularies,	tenets,	
doctrines	or	disciplines”	of	their	religions.65	This	ground	of	objection	would	
cover	religious	scruples	relating	to	conducting	same-sex	marriages;	however,	
its	application	is	wider	than	this.	The	ground	could	apply	to	other	situations,	
such	 as	 Catholic	 marriage	 officers	 objecting	 to	 conducting	 marriages	 of	
divorced	people,	or	a	Jewish	marriage	officer	who	objects	to	conducting	the	
marriage	of	an	atheist.	The	reason	for	the	omission	of	this	wider	ground	of	
objection	from	the	Civil	Union	Act	could	lie	in	the	fact	that	both	the	religious	
institution	 and	 the	 individual	 marriage	 officer	 must	 apply	 to	 conduct	
civil	 unions	 and	 it	 could,	 therefore,	 have	 been	 assumed	 that	 the	 issue	 of	
conscientious	or	religious	objection	would	not	arise.	A	person	who	objects	to	
same-sex	marriage	would	not	actively	apply	under	the	Civil	Union	Act,	thus	
putting	themselves	in	a	position	to	conduct	such	marriages.	Nevertheless,	this	
reasoning	is	clearly	problematic,	because	not	all	objections	would	be	based	on	
the	sexual	orientation	of	 the	couple.	For	 instance,	a	 Jewish	marriage	officer	
could	 be	 asked	 to	 conduct	 a	 civil	 union	 for	 a	 Christian	 same-sex	 couple.	
Although	the	marriage	officer	may	not	object	on	the	grounds	of	the	couple’s	
sexual	orientation,	he	might	object	on	the	grounds	of	their	religion.	Regardless,	
the	Civil	Union	Act	would	not	allow	a	marriage	officer	in	this	position	to	refuse	
to	conduct	the	marriage	on	religious	grounds.	The	absurdity	of	this	should	be	
clear.	
63	 Civil	Union	Act,	supra	note	34,	s	5(1).
64	 Ibid,	 s	 6.	 See	 also	 Elsje	 Bonthuys,	 “Irrational	 Accommodation:	 Conscience,	 Religion	 and	 Same-Sex	
Marriages	in	South	Africa”	(2008)	125:3	SALJ	473	[Bonthuys,	“Irrational	Accommodation”].
65	 	Marriage	Act,	1961,	supra	note	12,	s	31.
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Turning	 to	 civil	 servants	 conducting	 civil	unions,	 they	“may	 in	writing	
inform	the	Minister	that	he	or	she	objects	on	the	ground	of	conscience,	religion	
and	 belief	 to	 solemnizing	 a	 civil	 union	 between	 persons	 of	 the	 same	 sex,	
whereupon	 that	marriage	officer	 shall	 not	be	 compelled	 to	 solemnize	 such	
civil	 union.”66	 The	 only	 ground	 upon	 which	 they	 can	 object	 is	 the	 sexual	
orientation	of	 the	parties.	Religious	objections	 for	 all	 other	 reasons	 are	not	
accommodated	in	the	Civil	Union	Act.	It	will	be	remembered	that	there	is	no	
similar	right	of	religious	objection	for	civil	servants	conducting	heterosexual	
marriages	under	the	Marriage	Act,	1961.	The	different	forms	of	objection	for	
the	different	kinds	of	marriage	officers	and	the	grounds	upon	which	they	can	
object	are,	therefore,	problematic.67
V.      Legal and Constitutional Contexts
How	countries	have	dealt	with	issues	of	marriage	officers	who	refuse	to	
conduct	same	sex	marriages	or	unions	depends	on	the	legal	context,	and	in	
particular	on	binding	human	rights	norms	in	various	constitutions	or	human	
rights	instruments.	This	section	sketches	the	human	rights	norms	that	have	
influenced	state	responses	to	the	problem	and	against	which	state	responses	
can	be	measured.	
A.	Scotland
The	Scottish	retention	of	marriage	as	a	status	reserved	only	for	opposite-
sex	 couples	 can	 perhaps	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 family	 rights	 of	
same-sex	couples	have	been	only	gradually	recognized	since	the	early	1990s	
as	result	of	a	development	of	the	principles	of	family	law.	Although	earlier	
cases	regarded	same-sex	families	with	deep	suspicion,68	the	highest	court	in	
Scotland,	the	Court	of	Session,	in	T,	Petitioner	allowed	a	gay	man	to	adopt	the	
child	that	he	and	his	partner	had	been	looking	after	for	some	years.	69	This	case	
clearly	signalled	that	gay	and	lesbian	people	were	no	longer	to	be	stereotyped	
by	the	courts	as	a	bad	influence	or	harmful	to	children,	nor	a	danger	to	society.	
That	message	was	confirmed	and	emphasized	by	the	House	of	Lords	which	
held	 in	Fitzpatrick	 v	Sterling	Housing	Association	Ltd	 that	 a	 same-sex	 couple	
could	be	 considered	a	“family”	 for	 the	purposes	of	 allowing	 the	 surviving	
66	 	Civil	Union	Act,	supra	note	34,	s	6.	
67	 	Bonthuys,	“Irrational	Accommodation”,	supra	note	64.	
68	 	Early	v	Early	(1989),	[1990]	SLT	221	(Ct	Sess),	where	a	seven	year	old	boy	was	removed	from	the	custody	
of	 the	mother	with	whom	 he	 had	 always	 stayed	when	 she	 entered	 into	 a	 lesbian	 relationship,	 and	
delivered	into	the	custody	of	a	father	who	had	three	convictions	for	child	neglect.
69	 	T,	Petitioner	(1996),	[1997]	SLT	724.	This	case	was	followed	shortly	thereafter	in	England	by	In	re	W	(A	
Minor)	(Adoption:	Homosexual	Adopter)	(1997),	[1998]	Fam	58,	[1997]	3	WLR	768.
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partner	to	inherit	the	tenancy	held	by	the	deceased	partner.	70	The	House	of	
Lords	 subsequently	 built	 upon	 this	 ruling	 in	Ghaidan	 v	 Godin-Mendoza	 by	
requiring	all	rules	relating	to	cohabiting	couples	to	be	interpreted,	where	at	
all	possible,	to	include	same-sex	couples.71	Discrimination	on	the	ground	of	
sexual	orientation	is	now	explicitly	prohibited	in	the	provision	of	services,	the	
performance	of	public	functions,	employment,	pensions,	and	education,	by	s.	
12	of	the	Equality	Act	2010.
After	 a	 long	hesitancy	 from	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	 (the	
“European	 Court”)	 to	 accept	 that	 same-sex	 couples	 represented	 an	 aspect	
of	 family	 life	 as	well	 as	private	 life,	 that	Court	has	now	firmly	established	
that,	just	like	legal	differences	based	on	sex,	legal	differences	based	on	sexual	
orientation	 may	 be	 justified	 only	 by	 particularly	 serious	 and	 persuasive	
reasons.72	 In	2010,	 the	European	Court,	while	 rejecting	 the	proposition	 that	
limiting	marriage	to	opposite-sex	couples	was	contrary	to	articles	8,	12	and	14	
of	the	European	Convention,	finally	accepted	that	the	legal	regulation	of	same-
sex	relationships	engaged	“family	life”	as	protected	by	article	8.73	The	Court	
also	accepted	 that,	 for	 those	European	states	 that	have	opened	marriage	 to	
same-sex	couples,	any	difference	in	treatment	between	them	and	opposite-sex	
couples	would	necessitate	justification	based	on	particularly	persuasive	and	
legally	proportionate	reasons.
The	European	Convention	also	protects	the	right	to	hold	religious	beliefs,	
as	 does	 domestic	UK	 law.74	 Both	 the	 European	Court	 itself	 and	 the	British	
domestic	 courts	 take	 a	 robustly	 secularist	 approach	 to	 the	need	 to	 balance	
religious	freedoms	with	the	demands	for	equality.	Munby	J	put	it	thus:	
[I]t	is	important	to	realise	that	reliance	upon	religious	belief,	however	conscientious	
the	 belief	 and	 however	 ancient	 and	 respectable	 the	 religion,	 can	 never	 of	 itself	
immunise	the	believer	from	the	reach	of	the	secular	law.	An	invocation	of	religious	
belief	does	not	necessarily	provide	a	defence	to	what	is	otherwise	a	valid	claim.	Some	
cultural	beliefs	and	practices	are	simply	treated	by	the	law	as	being	beyond	the	pale.75
Laws	 LJ	 elaborated	 upon	 this	 with	 a	 classically	 secular	 judgment	
in	McFarlane.76	 Here	 the	 court	 held	 that	 it	 was	 not	 unfair	 or	 unlawful	 to	
dismiss	a	relationship	counselor	from	his	post	when	he	refused	to	offer	the	
70	 	Fitzpatrick	v	Sterling	Housing	Association,	(1999),	[2001]	1	AC	27,	[1999]	3	WLR	1113	[Fitzpatrick].
71	 	[2004]	UKHL	30,	[2004]	2	AC	557	[Ghaidan].
72	 	See	Salgueiro	da	Silva	Mouta	v	Portugal,	No	33290/96,	[1999]	IX	ECHR	309,	31	EHRR	47;	SL	v	Austria,	No	
45330/99,	[2003]	I	ECHR	71,	37	EHRR	39;	Karner	v	Austria,	No	40016/98,	[2003]	IX	ECHR	199	at	para	37,	
[2003]	2	FLR	623;	EB	v	France	[GC],	No	43546/02	(2008),	47	EHRR	21	at	para	91	(available	on	BAILII).
73	 	Schalk	and	Kopf	v	Austria,	No	30141/04	(2010),	29	BHRC	396	(available	on	BAILII)	[Schalk].
74	 	European	Convention,	supra	note	52,	art	9;	Equality	Act	2010,	supra	note	31,	s	10.
75	 	R	(E)	v	Governing	Body	of	JFS,	[2008]	EWHC	1535	(Admin)	at	para	108,	[2008]	ELR	445.	See	now	R	(E)	v	
Governing	Body	of	JFS,	[2009]	UKSC	15,	[2010]	2	AC	728.
76	 	Supra	note	54.
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organization’s	services	to	same-sex	couples.	His	argument	that	this	amounted	
to	 an	 infringement	 of	 his	 right	 to	 religious	 beliefs	 was	 rejected,	 Laws	 LJ	
holding	that:
[T]he	conferment	of	any	legal	protection	or	preference	upon	a	particular	substantive	
moral	position	on	the	ground	only	that	it	is	espoused	by	the	adherents	of	a	particular	
faith,	 however	 long	 its	 tradition,	 however	 rich	 its	 culture,	 is	 deeply	unprincipled;	
it	 imposes	compulsory	law	not	to	advance	the	general	good	on	objective	grounds,	
but	to	give	effect	to	the	force	of	subjective	opinion	…	The	promulgation	of	law	for	
the	protection	of	 a	position	held	purely	on	 religious	grounds	 cannot	 therefore	be	
justified;	it	is	irrational,	as	preferring	the	subjective	over	the	objective,	but	it	is	also	
divisive,	capricious	and	arbitrary.	We	do	not	live	in	a	society	where	all	the	people	
share	uniform	religious	beliefs.	The	precepts	of	any	one	religion,	any	belief	system,	
cannot,	by	force	of	their	religious	origins,	sound	any	louder	in	the	general	law	than	
the	precepts	of	any	other.77
B.	The	Netherlands
The	 Dutch	 Constitution	 contains	 an	 explicit	 prohibition	 against	
discrimination	 on	 several	 grounds,	 including	 religion,	 but	 not	 explicitly	
including	sexual	orientation.78		The	protection	offered	by	the	non-discrimination	
clause	acquires	horizontal	application	by	way	of	a	number	of	specific	equality	
acts,	closely	resembling	European	Union	(sex-)equality	legislation.79	Generally,	
direct	 discrimination	 is	 not	 allowed	 on	 any	 of	 the	 enumerated	 grounds,	
unless	 the	 law	explicitly	provides	 for	an	exception.	 Indirect	discrimination,	
on	the	other	hand,	may	be	objectively	justified.	The	objective	justification	test,	
developed	 by	 the	 European	Court	 of	 Justice,	 demands	 that	 discrimination	
must	serve	a	legitimate	government	purpose	and	that	the	means	to	achieve	
this	purpose	are	both	appropriate	and	necessary.	Despite	the	fact	that	sexual	
preference	 is	 not	 contained	 in	 the	 Dutch	 Constitution,	 it	 is	 an	 enumerated	
ground	in	the	Equal	Treatment	Act	of	1994.80	The	jurisprudence	of	the	European	
Court	in	its	interpretation	of	the	European	Union	(sex-)equality	legislation,	as	
described	above,	applies	in	the	Netherlands	as	it	does	in	Scotland.
In	addition	to	the	constitutional	provision	prohibiting	discrimination	on	
the	 basis	 of	 religion,	 article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 Dutch	Constitution	 also	 determines	
that	“[e]veryone	shall	have	 the	 right	 to	profess	 freely	his	 religion	or	belief,	
either	 individually	 or	 in	 community	with	 others,	 without	 prejudice	 to	 his	
77	 	Ibid	at	paras	21-22.
78	 	Grondwet	voor	het	Koninkrijk	der	Nederlanden	[Constitution	for	the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands],	art	1	Gw	
[Dutch	Constitution].
79	 	See	Algemene	wet	gelijke	behandeling	[General	Act	on	Equal	Treatment],	2	March	1994	[Equal	Treatment	Act]	
(an	English	translation	is	available	at:	“Equal	Treatment	Act”,	online:	Commissie	Gelijke	Behandeling	
<http://www.cgb.nl/english>).
80	 	Ibid,	art	1(b).
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responsibility	 under	 the	 law.”81	 Whereas	 protection	 against	 discrimination	
depends	on	comparison,	freedom	of	religion	can	be	regarded	as	an	autonomous	
claim,	which	may	extend	beyond	 the	 right	 to	 religion,	 thus	also	protecting	
deeply	held	non-religious	beliefs.	Finally,	the	Dutch	Criminal	Code	prohibits	
abuse	and	incitement	of	discrimination,	both	on	grounds	of	belief	and	sexual	
preference.82	
C.	Canada
The	 constitutional	 position	 in	 Canada	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	 The	 Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	 Freedoms	 contains	 a	
provision	prohibiting	discrimination	on	various	grounds,	including	religion,	
but	without	explicitly	including	sexual	orientation.	83	The	Charter	also	provides	
in	section	2	that	“[e]veryone	has	…	freedom	of	conscience	and	religion.”	The	
Charter	applies	to	regulate	only	government	action,	and	not	action	between	
private	individuals	and	entities.84	There	is	no	doubt,	however,	that	the	creation	
of	a	civil	marriage	constitutes	government	action.	Another	pertinent	feature	
of	 the	 Charter	 is	 section	 1,	 the	 so-called	 “reasonable	 limits”	 clause	 which	
determines	that	“[t]he	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms	guarantees	
the	 rights	and	 freedoms	set	out	 in	 it	 subject	only	 to	 such	 reasonable	 limits	
prescribed	by	law	as	can	be	demonstrably	justified	in	a	free	and	democratic	
society.”85	 This	 means	 that	 discrimination	 may	 be	 justifiable	 in	 particular	
contexts,	 similar	 to	 the	Dutch	provision.	 Furthermore,	 s.	 33	 of	 the	Charter,	
termed	 the	 “notwithstanding	 provision”,	 permits	 governments	 to	 override	
certain	 constitutional	 protections	 for	 a	 period	 of	 five	 years,	 provided	 they	
specifically	invoke	this	section.	Canadian	governments	have,	however,	been	
extremely	reluctant	to	use	this	clause,	though	there	were	certainly	those	who,	
during	the	marriage	debates	at	the	federal	and	provincial	 levels,	advocated	
its	use.	
By	 1995,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 came	 to	 accept	 that	 it	 was	
unconstitutional	to	discriminate	against	gay	and	lesbian	couples	on	the	basis	
of	 their	sexual	orientation.	 In	Egan	v	Canada,86	 the	Court	agreed	that	sexual	
orientation	was	an	‘analogous	ground’	(analogous	to	other	prohibited	forms	
of	discrimination)	under	section	15	of	the	Charter.	At	the	same	time,	however,	
by	the	narrowest	of	majorities,	the	Court	allowed	for	differential	treatment	in	
81	 	Dutch	Constitution,	supra	note	78,	art	6(1)	Gw	[translated	by	author].
82	 	Dutch	Criminal	Code,	supra	note	47,	arts	137(c)-(f)	SR.
83	 Canadian	Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	 Freedoms,	 Part	 I	 of	 the	Constitution	Act,	 1982,	 being	 Schedule	 B	 to	 the	
Canada	Act	1982	(UK),	1982,	c	11,	s	15	[Charter].
84	 	Ibid,	s	32.	
85	 	Ibid,	s	1.
86	 	[1995]	2	SCR	513,	124	DLR	(4th)	609	[Egan].
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terms	of	access	to	the	particular	benefits	involved	in	the	case	(old-age	spousal	
security	benefits).	Not	long	afterwards	however,	it	was	held	by	the	Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	to	be	constitutionally	unjustifiable	to	discriminate	in	terms	
of	benefits	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.	In	M	v	H,87	it	was	held	that	the	
exclusion	of	members	of	 same-sex	 couples	 from	 the	definition	of	 “spouse”	
in	 Ontario’s	 Family	 Law	 Act,88	 thus	 excluding	 them	 from	 spousal	 support	
claims,	 was	 an	 infringement	 of	 section	 15’s	 equality	 provisions.	 Such	 an	
infringement	was	 found	not	 to	 be	demonstrably	 justified	under	 s.	 1	 of	 the	
Charter.	 Though	 worded	 within	 a	 different	 constitutional	 framework,	 the	
principles	underpinning	this	decision	are	the	same	as	those	identified	by	the	
UK’s	House	 of	Lords	 in	 the	 cases	 of	Fitzpatrick	 and	Ghaidan.	 The	 Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	in	M	v	H	held	that	a	denial	of	the	potential	benefit	of	a	spousal	
support	claim,	possibly	imposing	a	financial	burden	on	a	member	of	such	a	
same-sex	 relationship	 that	 a	member	 of	 an	 opposite-sex	 couple	would	 not	
have,	“contribute[d]	to	the	general	vulnerability	experienced	by	individuals	
in	same-sex	relationships.”89	The	majority	stressed	that	“[b]eing	in	a	same-sex	
relationship	does	 not	mean	 that	 it	was	 an	 impermanent	 or	 a	 non-conjugal	
relationship.”90
There	were	a	series	of	legislative	changes	shortly	afterwards	at	both	the	
federal	and	the	provincial	levels	to	make	laws	conform	with	the	decision	in	
M	 v	H.	 References	 to	 couples	were	 amended	 to	 include	 same-sex	 couples	
as	well	as	opposite-sex	couples;	however,	 the	federal	government	hoped	to	
“save”	marriage	for	only	opposite-sex	couples,	 in	part	by	stipulating	in	the	
Modernization	of	Benefits	and	Obligations	Act	of	2000	that:	“For	greater	certainty,	
the	 amendments	made	 by	 this	Act	 do	 not	 affect	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	
‘marriage’,	that	is,	the	lawful	union	of	one	man	and	one	woman	to	the	exclusion	
of	all	others.”91	The	court	cases	on	same-sex	marriage,	referred	to	earlier,	put	
paid	 to	 this	hope	of	 so	“protecting”	marriage,	 as	 same-sex	marriages	were	
permitted	as	a	result	of	those	decisions.	
D.	South	Africa
As	a	result	of	its	more	recent	origin,	the	South	African	Constitution	is	unique	
in	this	study	in	that	it	contains	an	explicit	prohibition	of	discrimination	on	the	
basis	of	sexual	orientation	alongside	the	more	common	prohibited	grounds	of	
87	 	[1999]	2	SCR	3	at	para	2,	171	DLR	(4th)	577.
88	 	RSO	1990,	c	F.3,	ss	1(1),	29.		
89	 	Ibid	at	para	69.
90	 	Ibid	at	para	70.	
91	 Modernization	of	Benefits	and	Obligations	Act,	SC	2000,	c	12,	s	1.1.	This	section	has	since	been	repealed	by	
the	Civil	Marriage	Act,	supra	note	38,	s	15.
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discrimination	such	as	race	and	religion.92	Similar	to,	but	somewhat	broader	
than	the	Dutch	and	Canadian	constitutions,	it	also	protects	rights	to	“freedom	
of	conscience,	religion,	thought,	belief	and	opinion”	and	holds	that	the	state	
may	 recognize	 marriages	 conducted	 “under	 any	 tradition,	 or	 a	 system	 of	
religious,	personal	or	 family	 law.”93	The	non-discrimination	provisions	also	
have	horizontal	application94	and,	as	in	the	Netherlands,	are	further	enforced	
in	equality	legislation.95	The	South	African	Constitution	contains	an	additional	
right	for	“[p]ersons	belonging	to	a	cultural,	religious	or	linguistic	community…	
to	enjoy	their	culture,	practise	their	religion	and	use	their	language”;	however,	
the	 latter	 right	 “may	 not	 be	 exercised	 in	 a	 manner	 inconsistent	 with	 any	
provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights.”96
VI.     Responses to Objecting Marriage Officers in the  
          Different Jurisdictions
In	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Scotland,	 which	 lack	 conscientious	 objection	
provisions,	the	issue	of	objecting	marriage	officers	has	nevertheless	surfaced	
in	 the	 indirect	guise	of	 employment	discrimination	 claims.	Employees	 and	
job	 applicants	 have	 claimed	 that	 employers	 discriminate	 against	 them	 on	
the	basis	of	 their	religious	convictions	by	refusing	to	allow	them	to	abstain	
from	conducting	 same-sex	marriages.	 In	Canada	and	South	Africa,	both	of	
which	have	conscientious	objection	provisions,	the	arguments	are	based	more	
directly	upon	the	competing	claims	of	the	religious	objectors	on	the	one	hand,	
and	the	same-sex	couples	on	the	other	hand.	We	will	consider	 in	turn	how	
such	cases	have	been	dealt	with	in	each	jurisdiction.
VII. Claims of Employment Discrimination
In	 the	 UK,97	 the	 Employment	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 (the	 “EAT”)	 has	 twice	
in	 recent	 years	 faced	 claims	 by	 state	 officials	 seeking	 to	 be	 relieved	 of	 the	
obligation	to	perform	public	functions	for	same-sex	couples,	as	doing	so	was	
92	 	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa,	1996,	No	108	of	1996,	s	9(3)	[South	African	Constitution].
93	 	Ibid,	ss	15(1),	15(3)(a)(i).
94	 	Ibid,	s	9(4).
95	 	See	Employment	Equity	Act,	1998	 (S	Afr),	No	55	of	1998;	Promotion	of	Equality	and	Prevention	of	Unfair	
Discrimination	Act,	2000	(S	Afr),	No	4	of	2000,	[Promotion	of	Equality	Act].
96	 	Supra	note	92,	s	31.
97	 Both	cases	about	 to	be	discussed	are	English,	but	 the	employment	 legislation	and	 the	discrimination	
provisions	at	issue	are	common	across	the	jurisdictions	that	make	up	the	United	Kingdom	(including,	of	
course,	Scotland).
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contrary	to	their	own	personal	views.		In	McClintock,98	a	Justice	of	the	Peace	
who	 sat	 in	 family	 cases	 asked	 to	 be	 relieved	 from	 dealing	 with	 adoption	
cases	which	might	 involve	him	having	 to	make	 adoption	 orders	 in	 favour	
of	same-sex	couples.	His	request	was	refused	and	he	 felt	obliged	to	resign.	
He	then	made	a	claim	of	unfair	dismissal.		The	claim	was	dismissed	by	both	
the	Employment	Tribunal	and	the	EAT	on	the	ground	that	judges	could	not	
“cherry	pick”	which	 laws	 to	apply	and	which	 to	 refuse	 to	deal	with.99	The	
EAT	did	not	directly	address	 the	 issue	of	 sexual	orientation	discrimination	
because	 the	 claimant	 based	 his	 argument	 on	 the	 supposed	 clash	 between	
the	 Civil	 Partnership	 Act	 2004	 and	 the	 obligation	 under	 the	 Children	 Act	
1989100	to	treat	the	welfare	of	the	child	as	the	paramount	consideration.	This	
argument	was	dismissed.101	The	principle	in	this	case	was	not	limited	to	those	
objectors	 exercising	 judicial	 functions.	 This	 was	 confirmed	 in	Matthews	 v	
Northamptonshire	County	Council,	where	a	council	employee	who	refused	to	
be	involved	in	the	council’s	adoption	process,	insofar	as	it	might	have	led	to	
children	being	adopted	by	same-sex	couples,	was	held	to	have	been	lawfully	
dismissed	from	her	employment.102
In	Islington	London	Borough	Council	v	Ladele	a	registrar	refused	to	register	
civil	 partnerships	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 to	 do	 so	would	 be	 inconsistent	with	
her	 “orthodox	Christian”	beliefs,	 and	particularly	her	belief	 in	 the	 sanctity	
of	 marriage.103	 She	 was	 disciplined	 and	 threatened	 with	 dismissal,	 which	
she	 claimed	 amounted	 to	 both	 harassment,	 as	 well	 as	 direct	 and	 indirect	
discrimination,	contrary	to	the	Employment	Equality	Regulations,104	as	read	with	
article	9	of	the	European	Convention.		The	Employment	Tribunal	found	in	her	
favour	in	July	2008,	but	this	was	overturned	by	the	EAT	in	December	of	that	
year.	A	 year	 later,	 the	Court	 of	Appeal	 dismissed	 an	 appeal	 from	 the	EAT	
decision.105
98	 	Supra	note	54.
99	 	Ibid	at	para	19.
100	 	(UK),	c	41	(applicable	in	England	and	Wales).	The	equivalent	Scottish	legislation	is	the	Children	(Scotland)	
Act	1995	(UK),	c	36.	
101	 	Ibid	at	para	17.
102	 	(16	November	2010),	1901629/2009	(Employment	Tribunal)	(as	discussed	in	“Christian	Advisor	Loses	
Gay	Adoption	Case	Tribunal”,	BBC	News	 (16	November	2010),	online:	BBC	News	<http://www.bbc.
co.uk>).
103	 	(2008),	[2009]	ICR	387	(available	on	BAILII)	at	paras	2,	48	(EAT)	[Ladele	(EAT)].	The	claimant	ignored	or	
dismissed	as	irrelevant	the	legal	distinction	between	the	secular	and	the	religious.
104	 	Supra	note	53.	See	now	Equality	Act	2010,	supra	note	31.
105	 	Ladele,	supra	note	54.	
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The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	there	was	no	direct	discrimination	against	
Ladele	because	the	Council’s	actions	were	a	response	to	her	refusal	to	carry	
out	 civil	 partnership	duties	 and	not	 a	 response	 to	 her	 religious	 beliefs.	As	
well,	it	held	that	there	was	no	indirect	discrimination	because	the	Council’s	
(legitimate)	aim	was	not	only	to	ensure	that	all	couples	who	wished	to	register	
a	 civil	 partnership	 had	 access	 to	 a	 registrar	who	would	 do	 so,	 but	 also	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	Council	acted	consistently	with	 its	 stated	policy	of	fighting	
discrimination	 against	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 citizens	 and	 employees.	 The	Court	
endorsed	 the	finding	of	 the	EAT	 that	 “[o]nce	 it	 is	 accepted	 that	 the	aim	of	
providing	the	service	on	a	non-discriminatory	basis	was	legitimate	–	and	in	
truth	it	was	bound	to	be	–	then	…	it	must	follow	that	[the	Council]	was	entitled	
to	require	all	registrars	to	perform	the	full	range	of	services.”106	Importantly,	
the	Court	 held	 that	 the	 council’s	 policy	 of	 requiring	 all	 of	 its	 registrars	 to	
perform	civil	partnership	duties	was	a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	its	
aim	of	providing	a	non-discriminatory	public	service,	notwithstanding	that	
some	 other	 councils	 might	 not	 impose	 this	 requirement	 on	 its	 registrars.	
Indeed,	the	Court	was	willing	to	contemplate	that	councils	could	not	lawfully	
exempt	 their	 registrars	 from	performing	 their	 civil	 partnership	duties.	 The	
Court	held	that	the	Equality	Act	(Sexual	Orientation)	Regulations	2007,107	which	
prohibits	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	 in	regards	to	 the	
provision	of	goods	and	services,	“takes	precedence	over	any	 right	which	a	
person	might	otherwise	have	by	virtue	of	his	or	her	religious	belief	or	faith,	to	
practise	discrimination	on	the	ground	of	sexual	orientation.”108
The	Strasbourg	jurisprudence	was	fully	explored	by	the	Court	of	Appeal,	
which	concluded	that	the	case	law	was	fully	consistent	with	the	conclusion	
it	 reached.	Article	 9	 of	 the	European	Convention	has	never	 been	 interpreted	
to	require	that	everyone	should	be	allowed	to	manifest	their	religion	at	any	
time	and	place	of	their	own	choosing.	Generally,	article	9	protects	beliefs	as	
opposed	to	actions	motivated	by	these	beliefs.	The	only	acts	protected	are	those	
forming	part	of	the	performance	of	religious	rites.	So,	while	the	conduct	of	a	
ceremonial	ritual	might	be	protected	by	article	9,	the	refusal	of	a	pharmacist	
to	 sell	 contraceptives	 was	 not.109	 Likewise,	 the	 refusal	 to	 enrol	 university	
students	wearing	Islamic	headscarves	was	also	not	upheld	under	article	9.110
106	 	Ibid	at	para	49,	citing	Ladele	(EAT),	supra	note	99	at	para	111.
107	 	SI	2007/1263.
108	 	Ladele,	supra	note	50	at	para	69.
109	 	Pichon	and	Sajous	v	France,	No	49853/99,	[2001]	X	ECHR	381.	
110	 	Sahin	v	Turkey	[GC],	No	44774/98,	[2005]	XI	ECHR	173,	44	EHRR	5.
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The	first	Dutch	case	on	the	issue	concerned	a	special	civil	servant	whose	
fixed	term	contract	was	not	renewed	because	she	was	unwilling	to	officiate	
at	 same-sex	marriages.111	The	official	 argued	 that	 this	 amounted	 to	 indirect	
discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion.	 The	 CGB	 accepted	 the	 indirect	
discrimination	 argument	 and	 found	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 special	 civil	
servant	 was	 not	 objectively	 justified.	 It	 opined	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	 very	
difficult	 for	 the	 local	 authorities	 to	 organize	work	 so	 that	 the	 civil	 servant	
did	not	have	to	marry	same-sex	couples	and	that	same-sex	couples	would	be	
able	to	marry	without	any	problems	or	delay.	Thus,	the	decision	not	to	renew	
the	contract	on	the	basis	of	the	special	civil	servant’s	objection	was	found	to	
violate	the	principle	of	equal	treatment.
The	CGB	decision	precipitated	various	attempts	by	the	Dutch	Parliament	
to	 settle	 the	 issue.	 First,	 in	 2006,	 there	 was	 a	 motion	 to	 oblige	 all	 newly	
appointed	marriage	officials	to	officiate	all	at	forms	of	marriage;	however,	this	
motion	was	 rejected.112	 In	2007,	a	new	government	 included	 in	 its	 coalition	
agreement	a	statement	that:	“marriage	officials	with	conscientious	objections	
are	 allowed	 to	 excuse	 themselves	 from	 officiating	 same-sex	 marriages	 on	
the	 condition	 that	 another	official	 is	 available.	 If	problems	arise,	 initiatives	
will	be	taken	to	ensure	legal	security	for	the	objecting	officials.”113	The	most	
recent	government	did	not	discuss	the	issue	at	all.114	Whether	this	removes	the	
ability	of	local	authorities	to	formulate	their	own	policies	on	the	issue,	is	still	
unclear.115
The	second	complaint	was	directed	at	a	municipality	requiring	newly	hired	
civil	 servants,	 both	 regular	 and	 special,	 to	marry	 all	 couples,	 regardless	 of	
sex.116	A	member	of	an	orthodox	reformed	church	was	interested	in	serving	as	
a	special	civil	servant	but	did	not	apply	because	the	municipality	had	declared	
itself	unwilling	to	accommodate	objections.	The	CGB	deviated	from	its	former	
opinion,	explaining	that,	whereas	the	first	opinion	had	focused	on	pragmatic	
111	 	Decision	No	2002-26	(2002),	(CGB),	online:	<http://www.cgb.nl/oordelen/oordeel/218825/volledig>.
112	 	Netherlands,	Tweede	Kamer,	Kamerstukken	 II,	Vergaderjaar	2005-2006,	 27	017	Homo-empancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	17	“Motie	van	het	lid	Timmer	cs”	[Motion	by	Member	of	Parliament	
Timmer	cs]	(13	April	2006).
113	Coalitieakkoord	 tussen	 de	 Tweede	 Kamerfracties	 van	 CDA,	 PvdA	 en	 ChristenUnie	 [Coalition	 Agreement	
Between	CDA	(Christian	Democrats),	PvdA	(Labour)	and	CU	(Christian	Union)]	(7	February	2007),	online:	
<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2007/02/07/
coalitieakkoord-balkenende-iv/coalitieakkoord-cda-pvda-cu-tcm149-92516.pdf>	 at	 37	 [translated	 by	
author].
114	 “Vrijheid	 en	 verantwoordelijkheid:	 Regeerakkoord	 VVD-CDA”	 [Freedom	 and	 Responsibility:	
VVD-CDA	 Coalition	 Agreement]	 (7	 October	 2010),	 online:	 Kabinetsformatie	 2010	 <http://www.
kabinetsformatie2010.nl/Documenten_formatie_2010>.
115	 	See	eg	“Wetgeving	staat	weigerambtenaren	toe”	[Law	Allows	Officials	to	Refuse]	(19	April	2007),	online:	
Art	 1	 <http://www.art1.nl/artikel/7568-Wetgeving_staat_weigerambtenaren_toe>	 (legal	 research	
assigned	by	the	Dutch	national	association	on	discrimination,	Art.	1,	an	NGO).
116	 	Decision	No	2008-40	(2008),	(CGB),	online:	<http://www.cgb.nl/oordelen/oordeel/215285/volledig>.	
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aspects	of	the	issue,	this	current	opinion	was	based	on	principled	reasoning.	
It	held	that	municipalities	could	refuse	to	accommodate	religious	objections	
because	they	also	had	a	duty	not	to	discriminate	against	people	on	the	basis	
of	 their	 sexual	 orientation.	Although	 civil	 servants	 are	 free	 to	harbour	 any	
religious,	political,	or	other	ideas,	they	may	not	express	discriminatory	beliefs	
in	the	execution	of	their	office.	Municipalities	could	accommodate	religious	
objectors	by	employing	them	as	regular	civil	servants	who	did	not	perform	
marriages.	This	is	a	similar	approach	to	that	of	the	English	Court	of	Appeal	in	
Ladele.	Of	course,	this	judgment	does	not	assist	special	civil	servants,	whose	
only	function	is	to	officiate	at	marriages.	
Unfortunately,	 this	 solution	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 clear	 or	 settled.	 The	
deputy	minister	 responsible	 for	gay	emancipation	policies	announced	 that,	
according	to	her,	municipalities	should	be	allowed	to	accommodate	objecting	
officials,	on	condition	that	there	is	another	civil	servant	available	to	perform	
same-sex	 marriages.117	 In	 reaction,	 members	 of	 parliament	 have	 requested	
that	 the	government	 formally	end	the	practice	of	accommodating	objecting	
officials.118	The	consequences	of	the	holding	of	the	European	Court	in	Schalk	
that	 marriage	 rules,	 in	 countries	 where	 marriage	 is	 available	 to	 same-sex	
couples,	need	to	be	applied	without	unjustified	discrimination,	seem	at	least	
to	rule	out	current	local	practices	of	indicating	the	(un)willingness	of	marriage	
officials	regarding	the	performance	of	same-sex	marriage.	
A.	Claims	Based	on	Constitutional	Rights
The	South	African	Civil	Union	Act	 is	 still	 relatively	new	and	 there	have	
been	 no	 legal	 challenges	 against	 the	 conscientious	 objection	 provision.	
Nevertheless,	it	has	been	suggested	that,	at	the	very	least,	the	peculiar	way	in	
which	this	provision	accommodates	religious	objections,	as	described	above,	
fails	 to	meet	 the	 standards	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation.119	A	 related	 case	
was	recently	heard	by	the	Equality	Court	in	terms	of	the	Promotion	of	Equality	
Act.120	 The	 case	 of	 Strydom	 v	 Nederduitse	 Gereformeerde	 Gemeente	 Moraleta	
117	Netherlands,	 Tweede	 Kamer,	 Kamerstukken	 II,	 Vergaderjaar	 2010-2011,	 27017	 Homo-emancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	76	 “Brief	van	de	Minister	van	Onderwijs,	Cultuur	 en	Wetenschap”	
[Letter	of	the	Minister	of	Education,	Culture	and	Science]	(24	May	2011).
118	 	Netherlands,	 Tweede	 Kamer,	 Kamerstukken	 II,	 Vergaderjaar	 2010-2011,	 27017	 Homo-emancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	77	“Motie	van	het	lid	Van	Gent	cs”	[Motion	of	Member	of	Parliament	
Van	 Gent	 cs]	 (23	 June	 2011).	 Currently,	 the	 majority	 of	 Dutch	 Parliament	 opposes	 the	 practice	 of	
accommodation.	The	debate	is	expected	to	take	place	in	the	fall	of	2011.	See	JP	Loof,	“CGB	sluit	deur	voor	
gewetensbezwaarde	trouwambtenaren”	[CGB	Closes	the	Door	for	Marriage	Officials	with	Conscientious	
Objections]	(2008)	33:6	NJCM	Bulletin	791	at	799.
119	 	Bonthuys,	“Irrational	Accommodation”,	supra	note	64.
120	 	Supra	note	95	(designed	to	give	practical	effect	to	the	basic	freedoms	and	equality	guarantees	in	the	Bill	
of	Rights).
152  n  Canadian Journal of Human Rights                    (2012) 1:1 Can J Hum Rts
Park121		involved	a	church	which	dismissed	Strydom,	who	was	employed	as	an	
independent	contractor	to	teach	music	to	students	in	its	arts	academy,	when	it	
became	clear	that	Strydom	was	involved	in	a	relationship	with	another	man.	
The	church	justified	the	dismissal	by	referring	both	to	its	religious	doctrine,	
which	held	that	homosexuality	is	sinful,	and	its	fear	that	Strydom	would	set	
an	incorrect	example	for	parishioners.	The	Court	dismissed	these	arguments	
on	the	basis	that	Strydom	was	not	in	a	position	of	religious	leadership,	since	he	
did	not	teach	religious	doctrine.	He	was	merely	a	contract	worker	who	taught	
music	and	was	not	even	a	member	of	 the	church.122	 In	weighing	Strydom’s	
rights	 to	 equality	 and	 freedom	 from	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sexual	
orientation	against	the	impact	upon	religious	freedom,123	which	would	result	
from	failing	 to	grant	 the	church	an	exemption	 from	the	anti-discrimination	
legislation,	the	Court	found	in	favour	of	Strydom.
In	 Canada,	 within	 jurisdictions	 which	 oblige	 marriage	 commissioners	
to	marry	all	couples,	some	marriage	commissioners	have	resigned	in	direct	
response	 to	 the	obligation.	There	have	been	at	 least	 two	sets	of	 complaints	
launched	by	affected	marriage	commissioners	in	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan,	
with	all	initial	decisions	being	against	the	marriage	commissioners.124
Out	 of	 all	 of	 the	 countries	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	 only	 complaint	
by	a	person	who	was	 refused	a	 same-sex	marriage	 ceremony	was	brought	
before	 the	Saskatchewan	Human	Rights	Tribunal.	The	Tribunal	rejected	the	
marriage	commissioner’s	defence	that	he	ought	to	be	able	to	decide	whether	
or	not	to	provide	government	services	based	on	his	religious	beliefs.125	This	
was	effectively	the	same	reasoning	as	the	UK	Employment	Appeal	Tribunal	
in	McClintock,	discussed	above.
This	decision	was	upheld	by	the	Saskatchewan	Court	of	Queen’s	Bench	
which	agreed	that	the	commissioner	had	discriminated	in	refusing	to	officiate	
a	same-sex	ceremony	and	that	an	accommodation	of	his	religious	beliefs	was	
not	required.126	A	marriage	commissioner	was,	the	court	held,	“government”	
because	he	 or	 she	 implements	 a	 specific	government	 scheme.	As	 such,	 the	
121	 	[2008]	ZAGPHC	269;	2009	(4)	SA	510	(EqC).
122	 	Ibid	at	paras	17,	20,	22.
123	 	Ibid	at	para	25.
124	 	These	 cases	 are	discussed	 in	Geoffrey	Trotter,	 “The	Right	 to	Decline	Performance	of	 Same-Sex	Civil	
Marriages:	The	Duty	 to	Accommodate	Public	 Servants;	A	Response	 to	Professor	Bruce	MacDougall”	
(2007)	70:2	Sask	L	Rev	365	at	390-91.	See,	in	Manitoba,	Kisilowsky,	File	No	04	EN	462	(Manitoba	Human	
Rights	 Commission);	 and,	 in	 Saskatchewan,	 three	 cases	 before	 the	 Saskatchewan	 Human	 Rights	
Tribunal:	Bjerland	v	Saskatchewan	(Department	of	Justice)	(2006),	CHRR	Doc	06-888;	Goertzen	v	Saskatchewan	
(Department	 of	 Justice)	 (2006),	CHRR	Doc	 06-889;	Nichols	 v	 Saskatchewan	 (Department	 of	 Justice)	 (2006),	
CHRR	Doc	06-887.
125	 	MJ	v	Nichols	(2008),	63	CHRR	D/145.
126	 	Nichols	v	Saskatchewan	(Human	Rights	Commission),	2009	SKQB	299,	[2009]	10	WWR	513.
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marriage	commissioner	 is	“empowered	to	act	only	 in	accordance	with”	the	
relevant	law,	in	this	case	that	governing	marriages.127	The	court	held	that	when	
acting	as	a	marriage	commissioner,	a	person’s	“freedom	of	religion	ought	to	
be	limited	to	exclude	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.”128	The	
ability	to	refuse	to	perform	a	ceremony	for	religious	reasons	applied	only	to	
religious	officials	performing	religious	marriages.	McMurtry	J	said:
Regardless	of	 the	religious	basis	of	Mr.	Nichols’	views,	his	acting	on	 them	in	 this	
manner	constitutes	discrimination	in	the	provision	of	a	public	service	on	the	basis	of	
sexual	orientation.	Any	accommodation	of	Mr.	Nichols’	religious	views,	if	the	duty	
to	accommodate	exists,	is	not	the	responsibility	of	those	who	seek	the	services	that	
he	is	legally	empowered	to	provide.	If	any	accommodation	is	due	to	Mr.	Nichols	for	
his	religious	views,	it	must	be	accomplished	without	risking	what	occurred	here	–	
where	the	complainant	sought	a	service	and	was	expressly	denied	it	on	the	basis	of	
his	sexual	orientation.129
The	 Saskatchewan	 government	 then	 submitted	 a	 proposed	 law	 on	
marriage	commissioners	to	the	Saskatchewan	Court	of	Appeal	for	its	opinion	
on	the	law’s	constitutional	validity.	This	proposed	legislation	had	two	versions.	
One	version	would	have	“grandfathered”	existing	marriage	commissioners	
so	as	to	allow	them	to	refuse	to	perform	a	marriage	if	it	would	be	contrary	to	
their	religious	beliefs.	The	second	version	would	have	allowed	any	marriage	
commissioner	to	refuse	to	perform	a	marriage	contrary	to	his	or	her	religious	
beliefs.	 In	 the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	 the	Court	unanimously	held	
both	 versions	 of	 the	 law	 to	 be	 unconstitutional	 as	 unjustifiably	 infringing	
equality	guarantees.	R.G.	Richards	JA,	writing	one	of	two	sets	of	concurring	
reasons,	said:
It	is	not	difficult	for	most	people	to	imagine	the	personal	hurt	involved	in	a	situation	
where	an	individual	is	told	by	a	governmental	officer	“I	won’t	help	you	because	you	
are	 black	 (or	Asian	 or	 First	Nations)	 but	 someone	 else	will”	 or	 “I	won’t	 help	 you	
because	you	are	Jewish	(or	Muslim	or	Buddhist)	but	someone	else	will.”	Being	told	“I	
won’t	help	you	because	you	are	gay/lesbian	but	someone	else	will”	is	no	different.130
Richards	JA	also	expressed	concern	about	the	impact	on	gays	and	lesbians	if	
a	number	of	marriage	commissioners	refused	to	perform	same-sex	marriages,	
especially	in	more	geographically	isolated	areas.
127	 	Ibid	at	para	53.
128	 	Ibid	at	para	73.
129	 	Ibid	at	para	57.
130	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58	at	para	41.
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VIII. Discrimination and Accommodation Arguments
Resolution	of	this	issue	is	a	task	fraught	with	complexity.	It	depends	very	
much	on	the	constitutional	and	legal	background	of	the	jurisdiction,	as	well	as	
on	the	broad	characterization	of	the	issue	and	the	emphasis	placed	on	specific	
facets	of	the	issue.	Developments	in	the	Netherlands	and	Scotland	show	that	
the	issue	of	conscientious	objection	will	arise	even	where	there	is	no	statutory	
authorization	 for	 it.	 From	 the	Canadian	 and	 South	African	discussions	we	
learn	that,	even	where	conscientious	objection	clauses	exist,	their	content	and	
their	actual	application	will	often	be	in	dispute.	A	defining	feature	of	the	debate	
on	conscientious	objections	to	officiating	same-sex	unions	is	the	polarization	
of	views,	either	favouring	accommodation	of	religious	beliefs	or	taking	a	stance	
against	discrimination	against	homosexuals.	To	a	certain	extent,	the	perspective	
informing	 the	approach	of	a	participant	 in	 the	debate	–	“pro-gay”	or	“pro-
faith”	–	is	recognizable	in	the	description	of	the	problem,	whether	based	on	a	
discrimination	or	on	an	accommodation	analysis.131	So,	those	in	favour	of	the	
accommodation	of	objections	tend	to	define	the	problem	as	the	unnecessary	
exclusion	of	people	adhering	to	specific	faiths,	whereas	those	opposed	to	this	
accommodation	tend	to	emphasize	the	necessity	of	preventing	discrimination	
on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.	The	different	starting	points	can	determine	
the	 flow	 of	 the	 argument:	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 conscientious	
objectors	tends	to	result	in	a	focus	on	the	practical	possibilities	to	accommodate	
objectors.	A	focus	on	the	problems	of	same-sex	couples	tends	to	result	in	an	
objection	to	the	idea	that	a	more	historically	marginalized	group	should	have	
to	“give”	to	ensure	the	continuity	of	the	scope	of	protection	for	the	group	that	
has	historically	spearheaded	this	marginalization.	
Is	 it	 possible	 to	 satisfy	 both	 concerns	 by	 finding	 ways	 in	 which	 a	
government	can	accommodate	religious	convictions	whilst	also	guaranteeing	
the	right	of	same-sex	couples	to	have	their	relationship	institutionalized	and	
protected	from	directly	discriminatory	reactions?	Such	a	pragmatic	solution	is	
usually	unacceptable	to	those	who	reject	the	accommodation	of	discrimination	
against	 homosexuals,	 because	 of	 its	 general	 message	 that	 discrimination	
of	 homosexuals	 is,	 at	 the	 least,	 tolerable	 (while	 discrimination	 based	 on,	
say,	 race,	 is	 “beyond	 the	 pale”).	 Such	 a	 differentiation	was	 rejected	 in	 the	
Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference	by	Richards	JA	in	the	passage	quoted	above.132	
131	 	It	is	important	to	note	that	being	gay	or	religious	is	not	decisive	for	the	stance	taken.	Quite	a	number	of	
gay	people	agree	with	the	pragmatic	solution	to	accommodate	objections,	mostly	because	they	feel	they	
would	not	like	to	be	married	by	someone	who	secretly	rejects	their	lifestyle.	On	the	other	hand,	some	
orthodox	Christians	 take	 either	 the	 view	 that	 one	 should	 accept	 the	 consequences	 of	 ones’	 religious	
principles,	whereas	others	 contest	 the	 correctness	of	 the	belief	 that	 a	 believer	 should	not	 celebrate	 a	
marriage	between	two	people	of	the	same	sex.	Similarly,	not	all	Roman	Catholics	(for	example)	follow	
their	church’s	teachings	on	matters	like	contraception	and	divorce.
132	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58	at	para	41.
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Nevertheless,	 a	pragmatic	 solution	may	be	mandated	by	 the	 constitutional	
duty	of	reasonable	accommodation	of	religious	beliefs.	That,	however,	shifts	
the	question	to	what	would	amount	to	reasonable	accommodation.
A	 focus	 on	 discrimination	 against	 lesbians	 and	 gay	men	 usually	 leads	
to	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 questions	 such	 as	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 non-
discrimination	principle	has	priority	over	 freedom	of	 religion	and	whether	
or	not	there	is	a	hierarchy	between	protected	identity	markers.	The	right	to	
religion	was	defined	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	as	follows:
The	 essence	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 freedom	 of	 religion	 is	 the	 right	 to	 entertain	 such	
religious	beliefs	as	a	person	chooses,	the	right	to	declare	religious	beliefs	openly	and	
without	fear	of	hindrance	or	reprisal,	and	the	right	to	manifest	religious	belief	by	
worship	and	practice	or	by	teaching	and	dissemination.133	
Nevertheless,	 this	right	 is	generally	subject	 to	other	public	policy	concerns,	
like	 “public	 safety,	 order,	 health,	 or	morals	 or	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 and	
freedoms	of	others.”134	
Both	sides	in	the	debate	will	contest	the	severity	of	the	plight	of	the	other:	
one	side	will	point	out	that	conscientious	objectors	are	merely	excluded	from	
a	ceremonial	office	and	that	 they	can	perform	other	bureaucratic	 functions.	
The	contrary	argument	is	that	same-sex	couples	can	have	their	relationship	
institutionalized	 by	 other	 marriage	 or	 registration	 officers	 whereas	 the	
objectors	are	excluded,	even	if	only	from	one	specific	sort	of	job.	This	is	what	
one	might	call	the	“who	suffers?”	argument.	
A.	Discrimination	Arguments
The	discrimination	arguments	made	by	same-sex	couples	are	self-evident.	
The	ability	of	a	marriage	or	registration	officer,	a	civil	servant	after	all,	to	refuse	
such	a	service	is	direct	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	the	sexual	orientation	of	
the	members	of	the	couple.135	Whatever	the	motive	for	the	discrimination,	it	
clearly	amounts	 to	a	most	basic	denial	of	a	service	on	a	prohibited	ground	
of	discrimination.	That	said,	in	the	Netherlands	system,	where	a	member	of	
the	public	may	never	know	of	a	given	official’s	refusal	and	where	there	will	
be	no	delay	 resulting	 from	 such	 a	 refusal,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	mere	 fact	
that	an	official	officiates	only	at	opposite-sex	marriages	cannot	be	qualified	
as	 “individual	 discrimination”;	 it	 is	 at	 most	 a	 kind	 of	 abstract,	 general	
discrimination,	where	there	is	arguably	no	concrete	harm	done.	
133	 	R	v	Big	M	Drug	Mart	Ltd,	[1985]	1	SCR	295	at	336,	18	DLR	(4th)	321.
134	 	Ibid	at	337.	See	also	Ross	v	New	Brunswick	School	District	No	15,	[1996]	1	SCR	825	at	para	72,	133	DLR	(4th)	
1;	South	African	Constitution,	supra	note	92,	s	31(2)	which	determines	that	the	right	to	practice	religion	
“may	not	be	exercised	in	a	manner	inconsistent	with	any	provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights.”
135	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58.
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Marriage	or	registration	officers	who	refuse	to	be	involved	in	the	creation	
of	 marriages	 or	 civil	 unions	 involving	 same-sex	 couples	 argue	 that	 the	
failure	 to	provide	 them	with	a	right	 to	refuse	constitutes	discrimination	on	
the	 basis	 of	 their	 religion	 and	 infringes	 their	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 freely	
practise	their	religion.	While	this	argument	appears	to	be	based	on	indirect	
discrimination	(i.e.	religious	individuals	are	not	denied	a	position	so	long	as	
they	give	concessions	relating	to	some	of	their	beliefs,	while	concessions	are	
not	required	of	non-religious	persons),	it	can	also	be	argued	as	a	form	of	direct	
discrimination.	For	instance,	in	the	Dutch	context,	Loof	has	argued	that	having	
a	job	requirement	for	civil	servants	that	they	should	be	prepared	to	officiate	
all	marriages	is	directly	aimed	at	applicants	having	conscientious	objections	
and	thus	amounts	to	direct	discrimination.136	This	is	not	generally	accepted,	
however,	because	facially	neutral	criteria	or	policies	that	nevertheless	have	a	
more	severe	impact	on	a	specific	group	in	comparison	with	others	are	usually	
regarded	 as	 indirectly	 discriminatory.137	 In	 theory,	 an	 apparently	 neutral	
criterion	could	amount	to	direct	discrimination	if	it	is	employed	specifically	
in	order	to	disadvantage	or	exclude	a	specific	group.	In	this	case,	however,	
the	clear	government	purpose,	which	is	to	provide	same-sex	couples	with	an	
equal	right	to	marry	rather	than	to	disadvantage	religious	believers,	precludes	
such	an	argument.
There	is	an	opposing	argument	that	a	refusal	to	accommodate	conscientious	
objectors	does	not	 result	 in	discrimination	on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion	because	
religious	 and	 non-religious	marriage	 officers	 alike	 are	 required	 to	 officiate	
at	all	marriages.	Instead,	the	issue	is	to	be	framed	as	the	objecting	marriage	
officers	asking	for	(and	being	denied)	a	special	privilege,	namely	the	right	to	
discriminate	against	same-sex	couples.	Governments	cannot	consent	to	such	
requests	because	they	would	thereby	become	complicit	in	the	discrimination.	
The	 Saskatchewan	 Human	 Rights	 Tribunal	 has,	 for	 instance,	 held	 that	 a	
marriage	 commissioner	 appointed	 to	 perform	 purely	 secular	 marriage	
ceremonies	is	a	part	of	“government”	for	constitutional	purposes.138	
It	has	been	argued	that	it	is	an	“illiberal	notion	that	persons	performing	
public	 functions	must	 leave	 their	 conscientiously	held	beliefs	 at	 home	and	
church,	 and	personally	 embrace	 all	 state	policy	when	 they	 are	 at	work”.139	
In	this	context,	however,	an	examination	of	the	religious	or	secular	nature	of	
marriage	can	become	important.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	institution	of	marriage	
136	 	Loof,	supra	note	118	at	800.	See	also	E	Brems,	“Religious	Objections	to	Conducting	Marriages	of	Same-Sex	
Couples	in	the	Netherlands”	(Paper	delivered	at	the	seminar	Religion	in	the	Public	Sphere,	University	of	
Utrecht,	7-9	May	2008)	[unpublished,	on	file	with	author	Van	den	Brink].
137	 	Equal	Treatment	Act,	supra	note	80,	art	1(1)(c)	(this	part	defines	‘indirect	discrimination’).
138	 	MJ	v	Nichols,	supra	note	125	at	para	97.
139	 	Trotter,	supra	note	124	at	366.
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has	for	a	long	time	not	been	regarded	as	central	to	many	religious	traditions.	
If	that	is	the	case,	then	civil	servants	would,	as	a	result	of	this	interpretation,	
not	 be	 required	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 ceremony	 of	 religious	 significance,	 but	
merely	 to	perform	an	administrative	act.140	Moreover,	 civil	 servants	do	not,	
by	officiating	at	same-sex	marriages,	become	themselves	parties	to	same-sex	
sexual	 relationships	or	acts,	 i.e.	 they	do	not	engage	 in	homosexuality;	 they	
simply	engage	in	a	function	that	accords	status.	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that	
officiating	at	a	same-sex	civil	ceremony	is	consistent	with	and	conforms	to	the	
distinction	 between	homosexual	 status	 (acceptable,	 often)	 and	homosexual	
activity	(unacceptable,	usually)	that	many	religions	claim	to	be	so	important.141
The	lack	of	religious	significance	in	civil	marriages	was	stressed	by	one	
of	the	judges	in	the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference.	G.A.	Smith	JA	concluded	
that	the	performance	of	a	civil	marriage	by	a	marriage	commissioner	“is	not	
a	religious	rite	or	practice.”142	The	requirement	to	perform	the	ceremony	did	
not	limit	or	restrict	religious	belief.	The	judge	said:	“[i]t	is	far	from	clear	that	
officiating	at	a	civil	marriage	ceremony	carries	any	implication	or	connotation	
at	all	that	the	marriage	commissioner	who	officiates	necessarily	approves	of	the	
particular	union.”143
So,	from	the	perspective	of	the	conscientious	objector,	there	are	arguments	
for	 the	 existence	 of	 direct	 discrimination,	 indirect	 discrimination,	 or	 no	
discrimination	at	all.	It	is	probably	most	accurate	to	characterize	governments’	
requirements	 that	 all	 marriage	 officers	 conduct	 same	 and	 opposite	 sex	
marriages	 as	 having	 a	 more	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 those	 who	 believe	 that	
their	 religions	 forbid	 them	 to	 officiate	 at	 such	 marriages	 –	 i.e.,	 indirect	
discrimination.	This	does	not,	however,	 end	 the	 inquiry,	 since	 the	question	
then	 becomes	 whether	 the	 discrimination	 is	 justified	 by	 other	 legitimate	
policy	considerations,	including	the	protection	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	
other	citizens	and	the	achievement	of	governmental	policy	aimed	at	ending	
discrimination	based	on	sexual	orientation.144	
140	 	This	is	the	same	argument	that	was	accepted	by	the	English	House	of	Lords	in	Janaway	v	Salford	Health	
Authority	(1988),	[1989]	AC	537,	[1988]	3	All	ER	1079,	in	a	quite	different	context.	The	Abortion	Act	1967	
(UK),	1967,	c	87,	s	4	allows	doctors	to	perform	abortions	but	also	gives	them	a	right	to	conscientious	
objection.	The	House	of	Lords	held	that	this	statutory	right	does	not	extend	to	medical	secretaries	whose	
jobs	involved	making	appointments	for	patients	seeking	abortions.
141	 	See	Trotter,	supra	note	124	at	371,	n	19,	where	he	says	that	though	Canadian	law	does	not	distinguish	
between	homosexual	 behaviour	 and	 identity	 after	Egan	 religious	persons	ought	 to	 be	 able	 to	 ignore	
that	 legal	position	because	of	their	religious	beliefs.	Courts	are	noticeably	reluctant	to	accept	this;	 for	
example,	the	argument	put	forward	by	Christian	hotel	owners	that	they	could	lawfully	refuse	a	double	
room	to	a	same-sex	couple	because	they	would	thereby	become	complicit	in	potential	acts	of	“sin”	was	
roundly	dismissed	in	Hall	v	Bull,	[2011]	EW	Misc	2	(CC)	(available	on	BAILII)	(Bristol	Co	Ct).
142	 	Supra	note	58	at	para	147.
143	 	Ibid	at	para	142	[emphasis	in	original].	See	also	Hall	(Litigation	guardian	of)	v	Powers	(2002),	59	OR	(3d)	423,	
213	DLR	(4th)	308	(Sup	Ct).	
144	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	ibid	at	paras	95-97.
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If	 one	 accepts	 that	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 should	
be	 balanced	 against	 equality	 interests	 of	 the	 same-sex	 couples,	 many	
contradictory	 arguments	 present	 themselves.	 First,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	
direct	discrimination	–	by	the	marriage	officers	against	same-sex	couples	–		is	
more	objectionable	than	the	indirect	discrimination	against	marriage	officers.	
This	was	 at	 issue	 in	 a	CGB	decision	 in	 the	Netherlands	which	 involved	 a	
Muslim	 student,	 whose	 religious	 convictions	 prevented	 her	 from	 shaking	
the	hands	of	male	teachers,	parents,	and	fellow	students.145	Adhering	to	these	
convictions	meant	violating	a	social	duty	to	shake	hands	as	a	respectful	form	
of	greeting,	and	this	lead	to	her	expulsion	from	school.	The	student	would	be	
guilty	of	direct	discrimination	(against	men),	while	the	universal	imposition	
of	a	duty	to	shake	hands	would	discriminate	indirectly	on	the	basis	of	religion.	
The	 CGB	 solved	 the	 problem	 in	 a	 pragmatic	 way	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	
student	refrain	from	shaking	the	hands	of	both	men	and	women.	Although	
her	 attitude	 towards	 men	 would	 remain	 the	 same,	 equality	 legislation	 is	
concerned	with	actions	and	not	with	mere	attitudes	or	thoughts.	
It	is,	however,	not	immediately	clear	why	direct	discrimination	should	be	
regarded	in	a	more	serious	light	than	indirect	discrimination,	particularly	in	
a	context	where	it	is	not	certain	that	the	discrimination	involved	is	“merely”	
indirect.	Moreover,	where,	as	in	the	Netherlands,	the	couple	does	not	apply	
directly	to	the	marriage	officer,	but	to	the	government,	they	would	not	face	
the	 refusing	 official	 or	 even	 know	 that	 someone	 refused	 to	 marry	 them,	
provided	 an	 agreeable	 marriage	 officer	 was	 available.	 In	 other	 words,	 is	
awareness	of	indirect	discrimination	more	serious	than	unawareness	of	direct	
discrimination?	 Nevertheless,	 even	 in	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 could	 be	
argued	 that	 same-sex	 couples’	 awareness	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 government	
accommodates	 objections	 against	 same-sex	 marriage	 generally	 (while	 not	
accommodating	 objections	 to	 other	 marriages)	 is	 in	 itself	 insulting	 and	
unjustifiably	discriminatory.	
Possibly	 the	strongest	argument	put	 forward	by	 the	CGB	in	 the	second	
conscientious	objection	case,	is	simply	that	the	officials’	freedom	of	religion	
should	 be	 balanced	 against	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 same-sex	 couple	 and	 that	 the	
latter	 rights	 should	 take	 precedence	 because	 they	 are	 explicitly	 protected	
by	 law.	Although	 rights	 to	 hold	 opinions	 or	 belief	 are	 also	 protected,	 rights	
to	 put	 religious	 and	 other	 opinions	 into	 practice	 are	generally	 limited	by	other	
fundamental	rights.146	When	the	conduct	of	marriage	officers	is	ascribed	to	the	
145	 	Decision	No	2006-51	(2006),	(CGB),	online:	<http://www.cgb.nl/oordelen/oordeel/213922/volledig>.
146	 	For	 instance,	 in	 the	South	African	Constitution	 the	right	 to	hold	 religious	and	other	beliefs	 (s	15(1))	 is	
subject	only	to	the	general	limitations	clause	(s	36),	but	rights	to	practise	religion	(s	31(1))	are	explicitly	
qualified	and	“may	not	be	exercised	in	a	manner	inconsistent	with	any	provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights”	
(s	 31(2)).	 See	 Bruce	 MacDougall	 &	 Donn	 Short,	 “Religion-Based	 Claims	 for	 Impinging	 on	 Queer	
Citizenship”	(2010)	33:2	Dal	LJ	133.
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government,	they	may	not	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.147	
Furthermore,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 must	 maintain	 a	
discrimination	free	environment.	If	governments	accommodate	staff	members	
who	 hold	 discriminatory	 opinions,	 other	 gay	 and	 straight	 government	
employees	are	 repeatedly	 confronted	by	expressions	of	 that	discriminatory	
opinion,	as	shown	in	the	Ladele	litigation	in	the	UK.	
Most	directly	in	issue	for	many	are	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	same-
sex	 couples	who	wish	 to	 institutionalize	 their	 relationship	 by	marriage	 or	
civil	union.	MacDougall	has	argued	that	a	constitutional	protection	of	sexual	
orientation	should	make	it	immune	to	any	sort	of	argument	based	on	morality.	
The	government	and	its	public	servants	ought	not,	in	any	circumstances,	to	
be	entitled	to	qualify	 the	equal	provision	of	services	and	entitlement	based	
on	morality	arguments.	To	do	otherwise	makes	such	constitutional	protection	
contingent	in	a	way	that	contradicts	the	protection	itself.148
Arguments	that	seek	to	balance	the	rights	of	the	objecting	officials	against	
the	rights	of	the	couples	seeking	the	institutionalization	of	their	relationship	
obscure	 another	 issue	 of	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion.	Meyerson	
argues	that,	where	the	State’s	constitutional	responsibility	in	relation	to	religion	
is	not	merely	to	distance	itself	 from	religion,	but	to	actively	foster	religious	
diversity	and	tolerance,	conflicts	between	religion	and	equality	become	more	
complex.	When	 the	 state	 accommodates	 certain	 religious	groups	 there	will	
also	be	equality	claims	by	members	of	religions	which	have	not	been	similarly	
accommodated	or	by	people	who	are	not	religious.149	The	State	has	a	duty	not	
to	favour	certain	religions	above	others,	nor	to	favour	the	religious	over	those	
who	hold	no	religious	beliefs.150	
The	problem	may	therefore	be	more	difficult	than	it	first	appears.	We	are	
faced	not	only	with	a	choice	between	the	conflicting	equality	claims	of	same-
sex	 couples,	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 those	who	argue	 for	 the	 right	 to	 live	 in	
accordance	with	one’s	faith	on	the	other	hand.	There	is	the	additional	issue	
that	governments	which	allow	objections	on	one	basis	must	also	consider	the	
rights	 of	 those	people	who	would	want	 to	 object	 on	 other	 bases.	 In	 South	
Africa	and	Scotland,	the	only	basis	upon	which	marriage	officers	can	object	
is	 the	sexual	orientation	of	 the	couple.	 In	contrast,	both	 in	 the	Netherlands	
and	 Canada	 (specifically,	 in	 Prince	 Edward	 Island,	 and	 in	 the	 proposed	
Saskatchewan	 legislation	 discussed	 above),	 religious	 objections	 on	 other	
147	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58	at	para	97.
148	Bruce	 MacDougall,	 “The	 Separation	 of	 Church	 and	 Date:	 Destabilizing	 Traditional	 Religion-Based	
Legal	Norms	on	Sexuality”	(2003)	36:1	UBC	L	Rev	1;	Bruce	MacDougall,	“The	Celebration	of	Same-Sex	
Marriage”	(2000)	32:2	Ottawa	L	Rev	235.	See	also	MacDougall	&	Short,	supra	note	146.	
149	 	Denise	Meyerson,	“Multiculturalism,	Religion	and	Equality”	[2001]	Acta	Juridica	104	at	110-12.
150	 	In	the	UK’s	Equality	Act	2010,	supra	note	31,	s	10(2),	“belief”	is	defined	to	include	a	lack	of	belief.
160  n  Canadian Journal of Human Rights                    (2012) 1:1 Can J Hum Rts
bases	are	or	would	have	been	permitted.	In	practice,	however,	the	objection	
will	generally	be	based	on	sexual	orientation	alone.	This	fact	was	recognized	
in	the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	where	Richards	JA	said	that	same-sex	
marriage	“occupies	centre	stage”	in	this	issue.151	
B.	Duty	to	Accommodate
The	 other	 –	 and	 clearly,	 related	 –	 perspective	 on	 the	 problem	 focuses	
more	on	 the	duty	 to	accommodate	 than	on	 the	hierarchy	of	discrimination	
protections.	 The	 arguments	 here	 are	 centred	 around	 the	 employer’s	 duty	
to	 provide	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disabilities,	 pregnancy,	 disease,	
language,	and	so	forth.	The	question	then	becomes	whether	an	employee	may	
claim	to	be	exempted	 from	a	 law	or	 rule	of	general	application	 in	order	 to	
accommodate	the	employee’s	religious	or	other	beliefs.	The	general	approach	
seems	to	be	that	determining	whether	reasonable	accommodation	is	necessary	
or	not	depends	on	a	context-sensitive	balancing	exercise	between	the	various	
competing	 rights	 and	 interests.	 The	first	 consideration	 concerns	 the	nature	
and	the	importance	of	the	right	which	has	been	limited	–	in	these	cases	the	
right	 to	practise	religion.	 Included	within	this	 factor	 is	also	a	consideration	
of	the	nature	and	history	of	the	group	whose	religious	or	cultural	rights	have	
been	affected.	Smaller	and	less	influential	groups	may	be	in	special	need	of	
constitutional	 protection.	 The	 second	 leg	 of	 the	 inquiry	 asks	 whether	 the	
legislation	or	legal	rule	functioning	to	limit	the	right	to	put	religious	beliefs	into	
practice	serves	a	 legitimate	government	purpose	and	whether	 it	 effectively	
achieves	this	purpose.	The	final	aspect	of	the	test	is	to	determine	whether	or	
not	a	less	restrictive	method	exists,	which	would	attain	the	same	government	
purpose.	A	proportionality	inquiry	such	as	this	is	a	familiar	concept	in	human	
rights	law.152	
This	approach	highlights	two	additional	issues	not	canvassed	by	a	mere	
comparison	of	the	competing	rights.	The	first	is	the	need	to	compare	the	social	
and	historical	power	relations	between	the	different	groups	and	the	second	is	
what	might	be	called	“the	burden	of	inconvenience.”
Comparing	the	two	groups,	it	is	clear	that	lesbians,	gay	men,	and	bisexuals	
have	 been	 historically	 marginalized,	 largely	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 socially	 and	
economically	powerful	religious	institutions.	In	at	least	three	of	the	jurisdictions	
151	 	Supra	note	58	at	para	25.
152	 	See	Christian	Education	South	Africa	 v	Minister	 of	Education,	 [2000]	ZACC	11;	 2000	 (4)	 SA	757	 (CC)	at	
paras	31-32;	Prince	v	President	of	the	Law	Society	of	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope,	[2002]	ZACC	1;	2002	(2)	SA	794	
(CC)	at	para	114;	MEC	for	Education:	Kwazulu-Natal	v	Pillay,	[2007]	ZACC	21;	2008	(2)	BCLR	99	(CC)	at	
paras	76,	 97;	Patrick	Lenta,	 “Religious	Liberty	and	Cultural	Accommodation”	 (2005)	122:2	SALJ	352;	
Kenneth	Norrie,	“Accommodating	Religion	to	the	Gay	Equality	Imperative	in	Family	Law”	in	Jane	Mair	
&	Esin	Orucu,	eds,	The	Place	of	Religion	in	Family	Law:	A	Comparative	Search,	European	Family	Law,	vol	30	
(Antwerp:	Intersentia,	2011)	303.	
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surveyed,	 same-sex	 couples	 are	 probably	 numerically	 disadvantaged	
as	 against	 members	 of	 established	 religions	 which	 disapprove	 of	 their	
relationships.153	This	disapproval	is	commonly	publicly	and	unapologetically	
vocal	in	a	way	that	is	not	accepted	for	other	discriminatory	views	and	beliefs.	
They	 also	 continue	 to	 experience	 stigmatization	 and	 exclusion,	 sometimes	
because	of	government	exclusion	in	the	areas	of	education,	pensions,	and	so	
forth.	According	to	a	Dutch	survey	from	2007,	over	a	third	of	the	population	
regarded	sex	between	males	as	“disgusting”	and	about	half	of	the	population	
finds	men	kissing	in	public	offensive,	whereas	only	16%	feels	the	same	about	
a	man	and	a	woman	kissing.154	
This	context	of	numerical,	social,	and	possibly	economic	power	imbalance,	
between	same-sex	couples	and	those	who	hold	homophobic	views,	suggests	
that	 religious	 objections	 to	 officiating	 same-sex	 unions	 should	 not	 be	
accommodated,	 since	 such	 accommodation	 will	 inevitably	 strengthen	 the	
existing	prejudice	against	gay	men	and	women.	Withholding	accommodation	
from	illegitimate	beliefs,	such	as	anti-Semitism,	while	seeking	to	accommodate	
other	beliefs,	such	as	homophobia,	suggests	that	these	latter	beliefs	are	to	be	
accorded	legitimacy	and	respect.
Since	 same-sex	 couples	 are	unable	 to	 celebrate	 their	marriages	 in	most	
religious	 institutions,	 even	 in	 countries	 where	 legally-recognized	 religious	
marriage	remains	possible,	they	are	more	dependent	on	the	state	to	formalize	
their	relationships.155	Thus,	their	exclusion	from	religious	institutions	provides	
reason	for	the	refusal	by	the	state	to	accommodate	conscientious	objectors	in	
the	civil	context.	This	argument	does	not	apply,	of	course,	in	a	jurisdiction	like	
the	Netherlands	where	religious	marriages	are	not	recognized.
Another	 fact	 to	 consider	 is	 whether	 the	 refusal	 to	 accommodate	
conscientious	 objections	 serves	 a	 legitimate	 purpose	 (which	 involves	 the	
balancing	of	the	competing	rights	above)	and	whether	there	are	less	restrictive	
ways	of	doing	so.	The	proportionality	inquiry	in	an	accommodation	analysis	
directs	us	to	the	practical	question	of	whether	there	are	ways	of	accommodating	
which	 could	 protect	 rights	 to	 religion	 without	 unduly	 infringing	 equality	
rights	of	same	sex	couples.	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 same-sex	 couples	 are	 not	 unduly	 burdened	
by	 having	 some	marriage	 officers	 refuse	 to	 serve	 them,	 but	 that	 they	will,	
at	 most,	 have	 to	 make	 “one	 or	 two”	 more	 phone	 calls	 to	 find	 somebody	
153	 	MacDougall	&	Short,	supra	note	146.
154	Saskia	 Keuzenkamp,	 SCP,	 “Monitoring	 van	 sociale	 acceptatie	 van	 homoseksuelen	 in	 Nederland”	
[Monitoring	of	Social	Acceptance	of	Homosexuals	in	the	Netherlands]	in	Gewoon	homo	zijn:	Lesbisch	en	
homo	emancipatiebeleid	2008-2011	[Just	Gay:	Lesbian	and	Gay	Emancipation]	(The	Hague:	Ministerie	van	
OCW,	2007)	65	at	67.
155	 	As	in	MJ	v	Nichols,	supra	note	125	at	para	109,	where	the	complainant	was	Roman	Catholic	and	so	could	
not	have	a	religious	marriage.
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who	will	provide	 the	service.156	This	 ignores	 the	humiliation	 inherent	 in	all	
discrimination,	 which	 is,	 after	 all,	 based	 on	 assertions	 of	 superiority.	 This	
burden	is	unwarranted	given	that	there	are	clearly	ways	of	accommodating	
religious	objections	without	putting	same-sex	couples	to	this	inconvenience	
and	humiliation.	Richards	JA	in	the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference	held	that	
the	proposed	 legislation	 allowing	 refusals	 to	 officiate	 “would	perpetuate	 a	
brand	 of	 discrimination	 which	 our	 national	 community	 has	 only	 recently	
begun	to	successfully	overcome.	It	would	be	a	significant	step	backward	if,	
having	won	the	difficult	fight	for	the	right	to	same-sex	civil	marriages,	gay	
and	 lesbian	 couples	 could	 be	 shunned	 by	 the	 very	 people	 charged	 by	 the	
Province	with	solemnizing	such	unions.”	The	judge	thought	that	the	negative	
effects	would	be	felt	not	just	by	the	individuals	involved	but	by	the	“gay	and	
lesbian	community	at	large”.157	
The	 Netherlands	 provide	 an	 example	 where	 couples	 do	 not	 approach	
marriage	 officers	 and	 risk	 rejection,	 but	 where	 the	 government	 simply	
assigns	a	marriage	officer.	That	said,	 in	the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	
the	Court	declined	to	decide	whether	such	a	“single	entry	point”	system	is	
constitutionally	valid	in	Canada.158
Another	 practical	 solution	 would	 be	 for	 the	 legal	 creation	 of	 either	 a	
marriage	 or	 a	 civil	 union	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 simple	 bureaucratic	 function,	
similar	to	the	registration	of	births,	deaths,	and	adoptions.	There	is	no	reason	
why	the	state	should	be	responsible,	or	even	able,	 to	provide	a	celebratory	
element	 to	what	 is	 simply	 a	 change	 of	 legal	 status.	 Parties	 should	 be	 free	
to	 celebrate	 their	 marriages	 or	 civil	 unions,	 whether	 by	 way	 of	 religious	
ceremonies	 or	 otherwise,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 coupled	 to	 the	
governmental	 function.	 Such	 a	 secularization	 of	 marriage	 would	 remove	
the	basis	 for	religious	objections,	since	marriage	officers	would	be	engaged	
in	 a	 simple	 administrative	 act.	 The	United	Kingdom’s	 civil	 union	 regimes	
are	entirely	secular,	with	the	role	of	registrars	being	entirely	administrative.	
Although	this	regime	did	not	prevent	the	registrar	in	Ladele	from	objecting,	it	
did	make	the	rejection	of	her	objections	much	easier.	For	this	reason	the	breach	
of	 the	principle	of	 secularism	 in	allowing	civil	partnership	 registrations	on	
religious	premises	in	England	and	Wales159	may	be	seen	as	a	retrograde	step.
The	 benefit	 of	 viewing	 the	 problem	 from	 a	 reasonable	 accommodation	
perspective	 is	 that	 it	 creates	opportunities	 for	practical	 solutions	 to	 clashes	
of	 principle.160	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 reasonable	
156	 	Trotter,	supra	note	124	at	377.
157	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58	at	paras	94,	96.
158	 	Ibid	at	para	89.
159	 	Equality	Act	2010,	supra	note	31,	s	202.
160	 	See	Carl	F	Stychin,	“Faith	in	the	Future:	Sexuality,	Religion	and	the	Public	Sphere”	(2009)	29:4	Oxford	J	
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accommodation	 may	 not	 be	 the	 best	 vehicle	 for	 solving	 these	 kinds	 of	
problems	because	it	would	generally	work	in	favour	of	the	more	socially	and	
economically	dominant	parties.161
IX.    Conclusion
Within	 each	of	 the	 considered	 jurisdictions	 there	 is	great	 complexity	 in	
the	 legal,	 political,	 and	 social	 backgrounds	which	 surround	 the	 issues	 and	
resolutions	 concerning	 same-sex	 unions.	 The	 inherent	 complexity	 of	 the	
issue	combined	with	 the	differences	between	 the	approaches	 taken	 in	each	
jurisdiction	 may	 make	 it	 seem	 impossible	 to	 adapt	 solutions	 from	 one	
jurisdiction	 to	 another,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 relative	 similarities	 between	 the	
jurisdictions	vis-à-vis	their	degree	of	acceptance	of	homosexual	unions.	This	
makes	it	seem	even	more	unlikely	that	such	solutions	could	be	transported	
into	 jurisdictions	 which	 do	 not	 share	 such	 similarities.	 	 The	 existence	 of	
constitutional	 rights,	especially	whether	a	particular	 jurisdiction	recognizes	
the	 right	 not	 to	 be	 discriminated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 is	 of	
signal	 importance.	 Also	 important	 to	 the	 analysis	 are	 factors	 such	 as	 the	
way	 in	which	marriage	 is	perceived	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	generally,	 the	given	
roles	of	 civil	 servants,	 and	whether	or	not	 a	marriage	officer	 is	 considered	
part	of	the	“government”.	The	practical	political	clout	of	groups	–	in	this	case	
LGBT	 groups	 and	 their	 allies,	 and	 the	 opposing	 religious	 groups	 –	 is	 also	
very	significant.	Each	of	these	factors	varies	between	jurisdictions,	creating	a	
unique	socio-political	climate.	
Despite	the	varied	nature	of	the	four	jurisdictional	settings	in	which	the	
“refusal	to	officiate”	question	arises,	it	is	interesting	to	observe	how	this	issue	
generates	a	focus	on	similar	underlying	issues.	Are	the	competing	claims	in	
fact	claims	concerning	rights?	What	sort	of	discrimination	is	involved?	Does	
either	the	history	of	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	or	the	
population	 ratios	 of	 LGBT	people	 versus	 religious	people	play	 any	 role	 in	
resolving	 discrimination	 issues?	 Do	 direct	 discrimination	 claims	 trump	
indirect	discrimination	claims?	What	are	the	limits	of	“religion”	in	religion-
based	claims?	Is	it	easier	to	facilitate	one	sort	of	accommodation	rather	than	
another?	Should	the	government	simply	“get	out	of	the	business”	of	marriage	
ceremonies	as	much	as	possible	and	so	perhaps	end	state	involvement	in	the	
Legal	Stud	729	at	752-53.
161	 	See	Elsje	Bonthuys,	“Reasonable	Accommodation	as	a	Mechanism	to	Balance	Equality	Rights	and	Rights	
to	Religion	in	Family	Law”	(2010)	25:2	SA	Public	Law	666;	Ayelet	Shachar,	“Group	Identity	and	Women’s	
Rights	 in	 Family	 Law:	 The	 Perils	 of	 Multicultural	 Accommodation”	 (1998)	 6:3	 Journal	 of	 Political	
Philosophy	285.
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celebration	of	such	a	private	matter?	Or,	is	it	implicated	in	any	event	by	virtue	
of	according	status	on	the	basis	of	the	ceremony?	
These	questions	and	the	issue	at	large	are	not	an	easy	one	to	resolve,	and	it	
does	a	disservice	to	those	involved	with	it	to	pretend	otherwise.	No	resolution	
will	satisfy	everyone.	Nonetheless,	the	matter	requires	that	the	state	and	its	
institutions	consider	how	they	prioritize	the	protections	and	rights	of	various	
groups	 in	 order	 to,	 if	 not	 please	 everyone,	 at	 least	 do	 the	 least	 amount	 of	
harm.	Consideration	of	the	experiences	(positive	and	negative)	of	somewhat	
similarly	situated	jurisdictions	is	a	useful	method	for	arriving	at	an	optimal	
solution	for	a	given	jurisdiction.	It	is	not	necessary	to	reinvent	the	wheel	–	not	
entirely	at	least.
